

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART I.

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Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

1839-40 Y 28

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time, and to stave off the crisis in the affairs of the East; and nothing would tend more to the attainment of that object, than to indulge the Pasha in the expectation of the good offices of France and England being employed at Constantinople to secure to his son the succession to the Government of Egypt, on the same conditions on which it is now held by Mehemet Ali.

The above is the substance of Count Molé's conversation with me on this subject, and he requested me to report it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, January 27, 1839.

HAVE heard from good authority that advice has been given to the Sultan, to propose to the Great Powers the formation of a conference to decide the Oriental Question.

That the Great Council was held on the 22nd, to discuss the question of peace or war with the Egyptians; that the Sultan is as much as ever alive to that question.

That the Riala Bey has been sent to Alexandria in command of the steamer which took out the Sheik of the Mosque of Mecca, and has been ordered to obtain the best information of the state of the Army and Navy of Mehemet Ali.

On the 26th (yesterday), I heard from the same authority, that rumours continued to increase of war between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; that there is much movement at the Seraskierate; that a levy of 80,000 men has been determined to be made throughout the empire, including the capital; and that great changes are about to be made amongst the high functionaries of the Porte, and several of them will be replaced by men particularly known by their hostility to the Pasha of Egypt.

Hafiz Pasha has lately shown a disposition to induce the Sultan to act offensively against Mehemet Ali. Your Lordship will observe, in the Persian correspondence sent home by this messenger, what is said respecting an understanding between the Shah of Persia and Mehemet Ali (a fact I long ago knew and stated).

I have endeavoured, as far as my means permitted me, to counteract what I knew (previous to the later information) had been doing with a view to induce the Sultan to deviate from his intention to wait for the results of Rechid Pasha's embassy to Her Majesty being fully known, before he should take any steps whatever of importance; and with this end in view, I sent M. Etienne Pisani to Riza Bey, to urge the necessity for acting with the greatest prudence and caution in the difficult and delicate situation of the Sultan's affairs, when a false step might have the most serious consequences.

No. 3.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 1.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, February 6, 1839.

ON the 4th, there was a Grand Council of Ministers and Pashas, for the further discussion of the question of war or peace with Egypt.

The difficulty of obtaining from the Mussulman population men enough to complete the projected levies, was taken into consideration,

and a plan for raising Rayah Regiments, to be commanded by Turkish officers.

I am ignorant of the decision of the Council; the report of it is gone to the Sultan. I may not be able to ascertain the result, but I believe, if war be determined on, Hosrew Pasha will be made Bash Vekil (Prime Minister), he being the most marked enemy of Mehemet Ali.

I have at the same time to report, that the Ottoman treasury is said to be empty; that the Minister of Finance states his inability to provide for the most urgent expences, and upon that poverty justifies the continuation of monopolies.

I have written despatches, which will go by the messenger, to acquaint your Lordship, that I had endeavoured to prevent the adoption of any warlike measures against Egypt; and it will there appear that I have been aware of the state of things and mindful of it.

No. 4.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 3.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, February 8, 1839.

WITH reference to my despatches of January 27 and February 6, I have to say, that I do not believe the Sultan will commence hostilities against Mehemet Ali at present. I have just had a communication with his Highness, and recommended most strongly his observance of the greatest prudence in his conduct; and said, that his Highness could not at this moment have sufficient grounds on which to form a sound judgment of his position.

The Sultan thanked me for my communication, and renewed the assurances he previously gave, that he would do nothing precipitately. It is certain that Hafiz Pasha has been advising war.

No. 5.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 13.)

(Extract)

Therapia, February 12, 1839.

I HOPE the Sultan will avoid committing himself in any way at present. I omit no opportunity that offers, or that I can create, for renewing to His Imperial Majesty the counsel not to put anything to risk.

No. 6.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 11, 1839.

THE last despatches from Admiral Roussin, represent that the appearance of affairs at Constantinople is very warlike. The Ambassador states that the Grand Signor is intent upon attacking the Egyptians; and his counsellors, though differing in opinion from the Sultan, and apprehensive of the consequences of commencing hostilities, dare not risk incurring the displeasure of his Highness by giving him advice to remain at peace. On the other hand, Ibrahim Pasha, it is stated, says he will be cautious not to be an aggressor, but that if attacked by the Turkish Army, he has no doubt of entirely defeating it, and that he shall in that case march upon Constantinople immediately.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 7.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 15, 1839.

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as reported in your despatch of the 12th ultimo, you have held with the view of inducing the Sultan to avoid committing himself in any way at present; and I have to instruct your Excellency to press strongly on the Sultan, that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali; it would, on the other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 8.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 24.)

My Lord,

Therapia, February 26, 1839

THE Ottoman fleet has been brought out of port, and is getting ready to be employed, if wanted.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 9.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(Extract.)

Constantinople, March 7, 1839.

IT is reported, that some time ago the Sultan sent a Hatti-Sherif to the Great Council to the following purport:—

"Hafiz Pasha informs me that my Army is able to defeat the Egyptian Army in Syria. The Capudan Pasha tells me that my Fleet is strong enough to defeat and destroy the Egyptian Fleet. It remains for you to be courageous, and to do your duty."

To this Hatti-Sherif the Great Council returned for answer, "that his Highness' Ministers would do everything in their power to act in conformity with the pleasure of their master."

I have taken every measure within my power to persuade the Sultan of the advantages to himself that must be derived from patient and prudent delay of all hostile movements on his part. I hope the Sultan is convinced of the truth of what I have said to him, and I expect that he will not act at present against the Pasha of Egypt.

No. 10.

Mr. Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, March 28, 1839.

HEARING of the arrival of the messenger Barnard, on his way to London, Prince Metternich sent for me to request that I would be the channel of communicating to your Lordship the substance of a report which he had just received from the Austrian Internuncio, relative to the threatening aspect which affairs had assumed on the Syrian and Turkish frontiers.

His principal object in sending for me, however, was to beg me to call the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government to the necessity of at once putting a stop to these warlike ebullitions, by the united remonstrances of all the Great Powers; and he said that he was about to dispatch a messenger to Constantinople, with instructions to Baron Stürmer, to state to the Sultan and his Ministers, in the most positive terms, that Austria would not quietly allow events in the East to assume a character by which the peace of Europe itself might be compromised. That if the Pasha of Egypt was the aggressor, as the Turkish Ministers wished to make out, the Sultan might count upon the assistance of the other Powers in repelling any attack. But, that if the approach of the Turkish Army to the Syrian frontier led to a violation of the established *status quo*, the Turkish Government must not be surprised if those Powers withdrew their countenance from the Sultan, and abandoned the Empire to its fate.

Prince Metternich then added, that as he conceived this to be a case which admitted of no delay, he trusted that your Lordship would not lose a moment in instructing Lord Ponsonby to concert with his colleagues the means of warding off the mischiefs which the present conduct of the Sultan was calculated to produce.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 11.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 8, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 5th of April.

A letter having appeared in the "*Journal des Débats*" of yesterday, bearing the date of the 19th of March, from Constantinople, stating that the hopes which had been entertained of maintaining peace in the East had vanished, and that a war with the Egyptians was considered to be inevitable,—I, this day, enquired at the Foreign Office whether the last despatches from Admiral Roussin confirmed this intelligence?

I was informed that no despatches of a very recent date had been received by the French Government from Constantinople, but that Count St. Aulaire had written from Vienna, that the Russian Ambassador at that Court had communicated to Prince Metternich a despatch from M. de Bouténéff, in which it is stated, that although he, M. de Bouténéff, had declared that the assistance to the Turkish Government stipulated in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, could not be claimed, if the Turks were the aggressors in a war against Mehemet Ali, the Sultan had not renounced his warlike intentions; and that it was most desirable that the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople should be furnished with instructions to use the strongest language to deter the Sultan from carrying into execution those intentions.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 12, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, reporting the substance of a conversation with Prince Metternich, upon the disposition manifested by the Porte to commence hostilities with Mehemet Ali.

* No. 10.

With reference to what is stated in this paper, I have to instruct your Excellency to continue to co-operate actively with your colleagues in endeavouring by all means in your power to prevail upon the Sultan to abstain from any hostile proceedings against Mehemet Ali.

I add a copy of a letter which I have addressed to M. Hummelauer.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to M. de Hummelauer.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, April 10, 1839.

YOU may assure Prince Metternich, that instructions have already and frequently been given to Lord Ponsonby, to endeavour by all means to dissuade the Porte from commencing hostilities against Mehemet Ali; and that Lord Ponsonby has continued, whenever circumstances required it, and especially of late, to carry those instructions into execution. I shall not fail, however, to write again to his Lordship upon this important matter by the monthly messenger, who is about to set out; and Her Majesty's Government would vain hope that the united efforts of the Representatives of all the Great Powers will succeed in persuading the Sultan to remain quiet.

No. 13.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 6.)

My Lord,

Therapia, March 18, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a message I received this day from the Sublime Porte, and my reply to it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure in No. 13.

Lord Ponsonby to M. E. Pisani.

Sir,

Therapia, March 18, 1839.

I HAVE received your note containing the message from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, in the following words:

“D'après les dépêches reçues à la Porte, de la part de Hafiz Pacha, de Malatia, écrites il y a environ vingt jours, un corps très-considérable de troupes Egyptiennes, sous le commandement de Kourschid Pacha, est arrivé à Adana; tandis que le corps d'armée à Alep reçoit tous les jours des renforts. La distance d'Adana au camp de Hafiz Pacha, est d'environ soixante lieues. Cet état de choses donne beaucoup à penser à Hafiz Pacha, qui a été conseillé par les officiers Prussiens employés dans son armée, de lever le camp, et d'aller occuper certaines positions militaires situées entre l'emplacement du camp et Adana. Cette mesure est jugée nécessaire par les dits officiers. Les dépêches de Hafiz Pacha ont donné lieu à la tenue d'un Conseil. La Porte ne sait pas quelle réponse elle devrait faire à Hafiz Pacha, qui attend ses ordres. Elle se trouve dans le cas de prendre, en cette circonstance, l'avis de son Excellence Lord Ponsonby. Je le prie de me faire savoir quelle serait, dans sa manière de voir, la meilleure réponse à faire à Hafiz Pacha.”

To the foregoing, I request you will reply, in my name, that I am very sensible of the honour done me by the Ottoman Government, in desiring my counsel, and that nothing would give me more satisfaction than

to be able to prove my attachment to the interests of the Sublime Porte, by offering advice that might be of service, but that I value too much the interest of the Sublime Porte to venture to speak upon a military question, being myself ignorant of the art of war: and the question proposed to me is one that belongs exclusively to military men to determine. But I will, with the permission of his Excellency, take this occasion to renew what I have often and often said, with relation to the political part of the important matters of which this military question forms a portion, and again beg of the Sublime Porte to weigh most deliberately its decisions, and to make prudence and caution its guides. A false step might occasion irremediable mischief; and it seems to me, that the Sublime Porte can hardly be at this moment fully and completely acquainted with the precise situation of affairs in all those parts of the world where what is done, or doing, or to be done, must have a powerful action upon the welfare of the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c..
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

(Translation of part of the above Inclosure.)

"ACCORDING to the despatches received at the Porte, from Hafiz Pasha, of Malatia, written about twenty days since, a very considerable body of Egyptian troops, under the command of Kourschid Pasha, had arrived at Adana; whilst the *corps d'armée* at Aleppo receives reinforcements every day. The distance from Adana to the camp of Hafiz Pasha, is about sixty leagues. This state of things gives much anxiety to Hafiz Pasha, who has been advised by the Prussian officers employed in his army, to raise the camp, and to proceed to occupy certain military positions situated between the site of the camp and Adana. This step is considered necessary by those officers. The despatches of Hafiz Pasha have rendered it necessary that a Council should be held. The Porte does not know what answer it ought to return to Hafiz Pasha, who waits its orders. It finds itself under the necessity of asking, under these circumstances, the advice of his Excellency Lord Ponsonby. I request him to let me know what would, according to his view of the subject, be the best answer to return to Hafiz Pasha."

No. 14.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)

(Extract.)

Cairo, March 11, 1839.

THE Pasha may be expected here on or before the 17th instant, which is the 1st of the Turkish month of Moharem.

The Pasha's iron steamer left this for Essouan, five days ago, in order to convey him to Cairo.

Abbas Pasha, who is intrusted with the Government, during the absence of Mehemet Ali, has been alarmed by the reports which have been received from Constantinople, of the warlike preparations of the Sultan, which are said to be directed against Syria, and in consequence, wrote to press the return of the Viceroy to Cairo.

Orders have been given, and are in execution for getting the Pasha's fleet ready for sea. A considerable quantity of arms has been sent to Syria; and it is supposed that 4,000 troops, which have lately arrived at Alexandria from the interior, are for the same destination.

No. 15.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 13.)

(Extract.)

Cairo, March 11, 1839.

THE Riala Bey, who arrived here on the 14th of February, left this on the 1st instant for Alexandria, which place he left on the 7th instant for Constantinople, on board of the Sultan's steamer.

I saw the Riala Bey different times during his stay in Cairo, and he expressed much desire to see Mehemet Ali, but feared that he should not be able to await his return to Cairo.

I have not been able to learn that the Riala Bey came here with any ostensible mission; and conclude, that the object of his coming to this country, was merely to observe and to report the result of his observations.

But although the different public establishments here were ordered to be open for his inspection, and the chiefs of them were directed to afford to him all facilities and information, he did not evince any desire [to visit] them.

The Riala Bey was attended by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and lodged in the palace of Houssein Pasha in this city.

No. 16.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 14.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, March 19, 1839.

WHAT I am about to report may have connection with what I had the honour to communicate in my despatch of March 7, to your Lordship, and I entertain no doubt of its general truth.

"Hafiz Pasha and his officers are incessant in their demands and cries to the Porte to march against the Egyptians, alleging that there will never again be so favourable an opportunity for driving them out of Syria. The reports were received almost at the same hour with another report from Rechid Pasha, in which it is said that there is nothing to be expected from the Courts of London or Paris. The two reports have given force to the desire to attack Ibrahim, before his father can return from his journey; and it is almost certain that on the 17th instant, a resolution existed of following the advice of Hafiz Pasha."

Your Lordship will understand, that when I say, I believe in the general truth of what is stated, I do not mean to say that I believe the Ottoman Government will act in the way described, for on that point I give no opinion.

No. 17.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 15.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, April 1, 1839.

WITH reference to the apparent probability that war may break out between Turkey and Egypt, and to the desire of the Sultan to reduce his refractory vassal to better subjection, I have to report to your Lordship that Count Nesselrode tells me he is confident the Sultan will maintain peace, and resign the hostile intentions he cherishes against Mehemet Ali, provided the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople, hold to the Divan the same language on that subject.

I stated to his Excellency how assured I was that my Government would spare no effort to induce the Sultan to maintain peace.

My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and earnest desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect tranquillity: and I see no reason to differ from them in that opinion.

No. 18.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, March 23, 1839.

NOURI EFFENDI sent me a message on the 21st instant, indicating that my advice would be followed. I do not believe it had much weight, but I think there will be nothing done at present to disturb the peace.

No. 19.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 26.)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

1, Bryanston Square, 26 Avril, 1839.

IL y a quelques jours j'ai eu l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence qu'elle voulût bien me communiquer le plus tôt possible, le projet de Traité contre les prétentions d'indépendance de Méhémet Ali.

Sachant bien que vous n'avez pas perdu de vue cette affaire, je ne vous la rappellerais pas aujourd'hui si je n'avais pas absolument besoin de m'absenter pendant quelques semaines; ce qui me serait facile après avoir envoyé ce projet à Constantinople.

Si vous pensiez, M. le Vicomte, que la confection de ce document dût entraîner quelque délai, je vous serais infiniment obligé de me le faire savoir, pour que, suivant votre réponse, je diffère ou avance le voyage dont je vous ai parlé.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire,*

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 26.)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

1, Bryanston Square, April 26, 1839.

I HAD the honour, some days since, to request your Excellency to have the goodness to communicate to me, as soon as possible, the project of treaty against Mehemet Ali's pretensions to independence.

Knowing well that you have not lost sight of this matter, I should not recall it to your attention at present if I were not under the absolute necessity of absenting myself for some weeks, which I could easily do after having sent that project to Constantinople.

If you should think, M. le Vicomte, that the preparation of that document would occasion some delay, I should be greatly obliged by your informing me of it, as I shall defer or hasten the journey of which I have spoken, according to your answer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

*The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Extraordinary,*

(Signed) RECHID.

No. 20.

Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, of the 26th of April, requesting that I would communicate to you, as soon as possible, the draft of Treaty in opposition to the pretensions to independence advanced by Mehemet Ali; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that I propose to send it to you in the course of a few days.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 21.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

1, Bryanston Square, 27 Avril, 1839.

M'ETANT toujours fait un devoir de tenir votre Excellence au courant de la tendance que les affaires prennent à Constantinople, j'ai aujourd'hui l'honneur de lui annoncer que les craintes que l'on avait sur le commencement des hostilités entre l'armée de Sa Hautesse et les troupes de Méhémet Ali, sont très-affaiblies par la teneur des dépêches que j'ai reçues aujourd'hui même; la paix semble désormais assurée pour cette année.

Je suis, &c.,

*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire,*

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

Monsieur le Vicomte,

1, Bryanston Square, April 27, 1839.

HAVING always made it my duty to keep your Excellency acquainted with the turn which affairs take at Constantinople, I have to-day the honour to inform you that the fears entertained of the commencement of hostilities between the army of His Highness and the troops of Mehemet Ali are greatly diminished by the tenour of the despatches which I have received this day; peace appears to be henceforth secured for this year.

I am, &c.,

*The Minister of the Sublime Porte for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Extraordinary,*

(Signed) RECHID.

No. 22.

Viscount Palmerston to Rechid Pasha.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1839.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 27th of April, acquainting me that the tenour of the despatches which you had on that day received, led you to imagine that the apprehensions of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were much diminished,

and that it was thought that peace would probably be maintained during the present year; and I hasten to express to your Excellency the sincere satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have derived from this intelligence.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 23.

Lord Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 27.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, April 6, 1839.

THE messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to the 11th of March, arrived late on the 4th instant. That evening I sent for translation into the Turkish language, the substance of your Lordship's communication to me, "that you were agreed with Rechid Pasha on the principle of the proposed Treaty, and employed in preparing the details," and your other arguments. I added the best reasoning I could use, to induce the Porte to abandon warlike policy for the present. I pleaded for delay, knowing that I should do greater harm than good by calling for more.

The Mousteshar Nouri Effendi has replied to my communication, "that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty, because it is not the Treaty that Rechid Pasha wished to make; that the Porte desired to destroy the *status quo*, and the Treaty proposed by Lord Palmerston not only leaves it in full force, but also binds the Porte not to take advantage in future of any favourable occasion that may offer; that Lord Palmerston's Treaty, with an extraordinary abruptness, stipulates, simply, that England shall unite with the Sublime Porte to act against Mehemet Ali, if he or his successor (of his family) shall declare his independence, or commit any aggression."

Nouri Effendi has promised to give a written answer to my communication, as soon as he has received the Sultan's commands. I will detain the messenger that it may be transmitted to your Lordship immediately.

Tahar Pasha (Chief of the Etat Major under the Seraskier) sailed yesterday in the steamer for Trebizond, from whence he goes to the headquarters of Hafiz Pasha. He was dispatched after the Treaty in question had been submitted in the first instance to the consideration of Nouri Effendi and the Capudan Pasha; and secondly, to the consideration of the Council. I have reason to fear the orders of Tahar Pasha are not of a nature to please your Lordship.

I believe that M. de Bouténeff has been seriously endeavouring to prevent war; the Internuncio has done the same, and the French Ambassador also; and I have continued unceasingly to recommend to the Sultan to delay at least, if not to abstain altogether from everything that may commit him in a perilous enterprize.

No. 24.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 29.)

My Lord,

Beyrout, March 14, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the forced conscription is again in operation in Syria.

The levy to be raised is given out as 9,000 men.—a number, small as it may appear, the country will have great difficulty in supplying, so great has been the preceding drain on the population.

Some modification, it is said, is to take place in respect to the manner of raising the conscripts, who are not to be seized as formerly. An eye-

est également clair et évident, que comme l'on ne doit dans aucune circonstance vouloir l'effusion du sang, qui est une suite de la guerre, si Méhémet Ali reconnaît et pratique les obligations que lui impose sa qualité de sujet, Ma Sublime Porte ne prendra point le parti de la guerre; d'autant plus que les pays soumis au Gouvernement de Méhémet Ali, faisant partie de mes états héréditaires, la perte d'hommes de part et d'autre, et les maux qui viendraient fondre sur les pays, et affliger les populations, et surtout les classes pauvres, ne me toucheraient que de trop près. Mais que faut-il faire, lorsqu'il ne reste plus aucune sécurité de la part d'un homme dévoré par l'ambition et l'avidité, qui a conçu des projets perfides? Tant que cet état de choses dure, la sûreté et la tranquillité mutuelles ne sauraient exister, et je suis dans le cas d'entretenir à grands frais, une armée et un camp Impérial. Si l'on considérait cette question, comme on devrait le faire, sous les rapports des convenances qui doivent s'observer entre Gouvernemens; si on l'examinait avec bienveillance et justice, n'est-ce pas que l'on trouverait que la raison est tout-à-fait de mon côté, et que Méhémet Ali est coupable? Quant au Prince Metternich, c'est un homme animé de sentimens bienveillans, un homme d'un excellent jugement: je dois donc soupçonner et croire que cette chaleur et cette vivacité qui caractérisent le langage qu'il tient aujourd'hui, ne sont que l'effet du ton sur lequel on lui a écrit, soit d'ici, soit d'autres endroits. M. l'Internonce a parlé à Nouri Effendi de terme moyen pour la solution de cette question, sans avoir recours aux armes: cela veut dire la rentrée de Méhémet Ali dans la position qui lui convient comme sujet: mais cette position ne peut se réaliser que par la restitution, par Méhémet Ali, d'Adana, de Damas, d'Alep, de Seyda, de Jérusalem, et de Naplouse, et par la réduction de ses forces actuelles à ce point qui seul serait compatible avec sa qualité de sujet. Si les Grandes Puissances veulent travailler à faire naître un pareil état de choses, alors il serait digne de moi d'y donner mon adhésion Impériale."

Telles sont les paroles que, d'ordre du Sultan, j'ai rapportées à M. l'Internonce. Son Excellence ayant prêté une oreille attentive à tout ce que je lui ai dit, elle m'a assuré, que conformément aux ordres qu'elle avait reçus de sa Cour, elle va faire savoir tout ce que je lui ai rapporté au Prince Metternich.

J'ai également reçu de Sa Hautesse l'ordre de dire, que si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique veut faire un acte d'amitié et de bienveillance en adhérant à un Traité d'Alliance conçu dans le sens ci-dessus exprimé, Sa Hautesse l'acceptera avec plaisir; et M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est prié de faire savoir à sa Cour cette réponse du Sultan.

(Translation.)

(Translation made from the Copy of the Answer.)

Reply of the Sultan to the Communications made to him on the subject of Mehemet Ali; communicated by his Excellency the Mousteshar Nouri Effendi to his Excellency Lord Ponsonby, April 28, 1839.

THE instructions which accompanied a note on the part of your Excellency, have been laid before His Highness, who has taken cognizance of them.

The Austrian Internuncio has communicated to the Sublime Porte the reflections which Prince Metternich has made upon a measure which he proposes: namely, to abandon the warlike preparations directed against the individual who calls himself Pasha of Egypt. He even came, a few days ago, to the Mabain, to cause some considerations to be submitted to His Highness, touching the necessity of taking a middle course for the purpose of putting an end to this embarrassing question, without having recourse to war. I then received from His Highness' own mouth the order to say to the Internuncio what follows: "This Mehemet Ali has not ceased, since the affair of Conia, from putting himself in a position to undertake anything. He ruins the countries which have passed under his rule, and he reduces the inha-

bitants to misery; he levies troops, and causes batteries and other fortifications to be erected. My Sublime Porte had not, until recently, contemplated the erection of fortifications anywhere; and it is only since last year that it undertook to cause some positions in the neighbourhood of Conia to be fortified. And since the proceedings and the foolish pretensions of Mehemet Ali are of a nature not to leave us a shadow of security, it has been necessary to take the measures of defence which prudence suggests, by sending openly and in the face of the whole world, the necessary troops and munitions of war towards Sivas and Conia. If the Great Powers were to say nothing against the rebellious acts of Mehemet Ali, and if they were to persist, at the same time, in wishing to prevent my Sublime Porte from acting, this, certainly, would not be in conformity with the deference which Governments owe to one another, nor in accordance with their professed sentiments of goodwill; and it is clear and evident that if Mehemet Ali commits any act of aggression, my Sublime Porte can no longer remain inactive. It is equally clear and evident, that since the effusion of blood, which is a consequence of war, is in no case to be desired, if Mehemet Ali acknowledges and performs the duties which are imposed on him by his quality of subject, my Sublime Porte will not have recourse to war; the more so, because, as the countries placed under the Government of Mehemet Ali constitute a part of my hereditary possessions, the loss of men on both sides, and the evils which would befall the country and afflict the population, and above all, the poorer classes, would touch me too nearly. But what is to be done, when there no longer remains any security with respect to a man devoured up by ambition and greediness, who has conceived perfidious plans? As long as this state of things lasts, mutual safety and tranquillity cannot exist, and I am obliged, at a great expence, to keep up an army and an Imperial camp. If this question were considered, as it ought to be considered, with reference to the relations which Governments should maintain with one another; if it were examined with goodwill and justice, would it not be found that reason is entirely on my side, and that Mehemet Ali is to blame? With regard to Prince Metternich, he is a man animated by kind feelings, a man of an excellent judgment. I am therefore led to suspect and to believe that the warmth and vivacity which characterise the language that he now holds, are the effect of the tone which has been used in writing to him, either from hence or from other places. The Internuncio has spoken to Nouri Effendi about a middle course for the solution of this question, without having recourse to arms; that means, Mehemet Ali's return to the position which becomes him as a subject; but this position cannot be realized, unless Mehemet Ali restores Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and reduces his present forces to such amount as would alone be compatible with his condition as a subject. If the Great Powers are willing to labour to bring about such a state of things, then it would be worthy of me to give my Imperial assent."

Such are the words which, by the Sultan's orders, I reported to the Internuncio. His Excellency, having listened attentively to all that I said to him, assured me that, agreeably to the orders which he had received from his Court, he would report to Prince Metternich all that I had stated to him.

I likewise received directions from His Highness to say, that if the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is willing to do an act of friendship and goodwill by becoming a party to a Treaty of Alliance drawn up in the sense above expressed, His Highness will receive it with pleasure; and the British Ambassador is requested to make known to his Court this answer of the Sultan.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

Paris, June 7, 1839.

(Extract.)

I HAD an interview this morning with Marshal Soult. His Excellency has received no despatches from the East of a later date than those which he communicated to me on Wednesday last, and of which I transmitted the substance to your Lordship by the post of that day.

The Marshal expressed his regret, that I had not as yet been able to make any official communication to him from your Lordship, in regard to the instructions to be given to the Admiral of the combined fleet on the Levant station. He said that the question of these instructions had been mooted in the Cabinet Council by Admiral Duperré, but that he, the Marshal, had desired to defer deliberating upon it, until they were in possession of the opinion of the British Government on that matter.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

Therapia, May 19, 1839.

My Lord,

I COMMUNICATED to Nouri Effendi the substance of your Lordship's instruction of March 15, which gave great dissatisfaction.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

Therapia, May 20, 1839.

(Extract.)

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CAMPBELL transmitted to your Lordship, copy of a letter, dated May 1st, written by Artin Bey, and communicated to the Consuls. A copy also reached the Sultan, who was so exasperated, that he gave orders that war should be declared against Mehemet Ali. Reflection, however, caused that order to be recalled, but orders were issued to hasten the equipment of the fleet, and to press the despatch of troops and military stores to the army: both orders are in execution.

The Sultan said he would rather die, than not endeavour to destroy his rebel subject. The language of those about the Sultan is: "We hope for success, because all the Syrians are enemies to the Pasha."

Nobody here doubts of war, and the general opinion is, that the Army of the Sultan will be defeated. My opinion is not worth anything, as I am not skilled in military matters.

If the Sultan should be victorious, there will be comparatively little difficulty, and it is enough at present to consider what may be the probable consequences of his defeat. The common opinion is, that the conqueror will march for the Capital, having declared himself independent. It appears to me more likely he will take the Pashalics of Bagdad, Orfa, Diarbekir, &c., &c.

The Great Powers have established, as the criterion of right or wrong, the abstinence from aggression, declaring the culpable to be the Sultan or the Pasha, as the one or the other might be the first to commence hostilities. Judgment has been given by Russia, who assumed to speak in the name of all, and the Pasha has been declared the aggressor. The charge of aggression made against him by Russia, is confined to late acts done by the Pasha; but from the beginning, during

the whole period, as well as in this latter hour, the Pasha has always been the aggressor, and the Sultan has a right to claim from the Great Powers the maintenance of their own declarations. Passing over all the acts of the Pasha until the moment when the presumed (which your Lordship knows never existed) settlement of Koniah was made, the Sultan will be found from that hour in a state of quiescence, relying upon the intervention of the Great Powers for the settlement of differences as to territorial questions between himself and the Pasha, and for the payment of the miserable pittance of tribute due to him for the possession of kingdoms alienated from him. He made no preparations for war; committed no overt acts indicative of design to use force: he remained in a state actually inadequate to the defence of his remaining territories, until he was forced to have recourse to augmented armaments, by the menacing attitude of the Pasha, who had never ceased to assail the Sultan's power by intrigues, and had openly fortified all the avenues that lead through the Taurus into the provinces still under the Sultan's sceptre. The Pasha had never ceased to increase and perfect his army and his fleet, nor to push his conquests into new countries for the establishment of his power: and he made those conquests in his own name; he openly called on the Great Powers to sanction his assumption of independence of the Sultan. Could his intentions be doubted? The Sultan had the right of self-defence to justify his tardy exertions to guard against danger, and he had the further right, inherent in every man, be he sovereign or be he dependent, of placing himself in a position to repel insults.

No one of the Great Powers would have continued in a pacific attitude so long as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to even a small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear with.

Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth; the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor.

No. 45.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 9.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, June 1, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH forwards to your Lordship the reports of the Internuncio, which agree with those of Lord Ponsonby as to the danger of war.

The Prince seeming to expect much from the arrival at Constantinople of his advice to the Porte, as to the course they ought to pursue, I observed to him, that the reply from thence might lead to the commencement of a negotiation, but it might also announce that of hostilities.

He admitted this, adding, that the only course to pursue was, for the Four Powers to agree among themselves what line to take.

If Her Majesty's Government should be disposed to enter into the Prince's views, as to the disposition to be made of Egypt, it will be necessary to decide whether the succession should be made personal to Ibrahim Pasha, or extended to his descendants, or to other descendants of Mehemet Ali. I would further remark, that such an arrangement, if it were practicable, would offer the best chance of preserving order in Egypt after Mehemet Ali's death, which will otherwise be exposed to many chances.

This first branch of the question being disposed of, I remarked to the Prince, that in all affairs there is a moment when reasonings cease, and action begins. He admitted the truth of this, and also, that in this instance the moment might possibly be arrived. That it was only then that the real affair commenced; and that it was probable that we might now be at the beginning of its end.

Is it not time then, I asked, to foresee, and if possible, to regulate its march? He said it was; and that as the first branch of the affair could only be conducted by the joint moral weight of the Four Powers, so must

ARTILLERY.

1st of the Guard.
2nd of Foot.

2 Regiments.

Note of Egyptian Forces expected to arrive.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
1st of the Guard.	
6th of the Line.	6th.
35th ditto	11th.
<hr/>	<hr/>
3 Regiments.	2 Regiments.
And 6 Regiments of the Line are expected from Egypt.	

Inclosure 4 in No. 51.

Note of the Forces at Adana and the Defile of the Taurus.

At Adana.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
29th of the Line.	5th.
30th ditto.	7th.
<hr/>	<hr/>
2 Regiments.	2 Regiments.

At the Defile of the Taurus.

5th of Infantry of the Line.
2 Battalions of Sappers.
2 Battalions of Artillerymen.
And 2 Forts and 8 Batteries, mounting in all 150 Cannon.

No. 52.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord,

Beyrout, May 9, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that accounts have been received at this place, of the passage of the Euphrates by the Sultan's troops, at Bir, and that forces under Hafiz Pasha are also advancing on the northern frontier.

On the other hand, the Egyptian troops have been summoned to Aleppo by Ibrahim Pasha, from all parts of Syria, and he has encamped his forces in the immediate neighbourhood of that city. His Highness is strongly fortifying and entrenching his position,—apparently with the intention to wait an attack, which is universally believed to be imminent.

The conflict, however, should it take place, will probably be deferred till after the Turkish moon Saffar, ending the 12th instant,—a season considered inauspicious by the Moslems for commencing military operations.

The maximum of Ibrahim Pasha's force in Syria is estimated at 60,000 regular troops. Report makes that of the Sultan at least double the amount, including irregulars; but it is not possible, at this distance, to number the latter army with any degree of accuracy. And indeed all that transpires just now, relative to pending events, coming chiefly through the organs or partizans of the respective parties, must be received with much caution.

The most active preparations are making by this Government to maintain a prompt communication with Egypt. Couriers from Aleppo are to reach Cairo the sixth day.

The Emir Bechir has received orders to send a force to Damascus and Tripoli; and about 1,000 Christian troops will march to each of the above places, under the command of the son and grandson of the Emir. This is a measure of precaution, as at neither of the above cities is the Mahomedan population believed to be well affected to the existing Government. Indeed any success on the part of the Sultan's troops, it is believed, would be the signal for revolt not only at those places, but throughout Syria.

An exception to this feeling I am of opinion may be looked for amongst the Christian troops of Lebanon, who certainly entertain fears that should the Sultan repossess himself of Syria, the Mahomedans would regain the ascendancy, and once more exhibit their naturally intolerant and fanatical character towards other sects.

In this immediate neighbourhood all is for the present tranquil, but much anxiety exists amongst all classes, but especially in the Christian population, as to the issue of pending events.

An individual whose life is of immense importance to the Egyptian cause at the present juncture, is Solyman Pasha, perhaps the only person in Ibrahim Pasha's army possessing the requisite talents for extensive and combined military operations.

No reliance can be placed on the accounts received respecting the insurrection in the Ledgæa. I have observed that as the monthly period of the communication with Europe approaches, the authorities represent them as terminated, and that subsequent information belies those accounts.

A distinguished traveller who has just returned to this place from a tour along the banks of the Jordan, assures me, that he found the Arab tribes there all opposed to Ibrahim Pasha, and ardently desirous of an opportunity of acting hostilely against him. They had, of late, begun to show themselves in large masses, armed, on this side Jordan, and to enter the villages, which a little time ago they did not venture to do. The news of the Sultan's troops having crossed the Euphrates, had not reached the Jordan, when the traveller alluded to left its banks about eight days ago; but he does not doubt the news will afford the liveliest pleasure to the Arab tribes there, and lead to an open demonstration of their feelings should a collision between the armies take place.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—13th May, up to this day, nothing new relative to the movement of the armies.

N. M.

No. 53.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord,

Damascus, May 10, 1839.

ON the 27th ultimo, I received intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul F. H. S. Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 23rd, of the advance of the Sultan's troops, crossing the Euphrates at Bir, and the measures taking by His Highness Ibrahim Pasha. This information I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, *viâ* Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post.

On the 30th, I received further intelligence from Mr. Pro-Consul Werry at Aleppo, under date of the 25th and 27th, of the further movements of the Sultan's Army and His Highness Ibrahim Pasha's measures, which I transmitted the same day to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, *viâ* Beyrout, and to Her Majesty's Resident in Egypt, by the Government post. And on the 29th, I transmitted *viâ* Beyrout, to Her Majesty's Resident at Cairo, the information I was in possession of on the foregoing subjects.

raisons ont quelque chose de précieux et ne sauraient être rejetées sans examen.

Quoiqu'il en soit, au point où en sont venues les choses, il faut espérer que toutes les Puissances prendront le parti de la Porte et mettront ce qu'il peut y avoir d'obscur dans son langage, sur le compte de ses embarras.

Si j'ai cru devoir toucher ici la question de l'agression, c'est que de sa solution dépendra la conduite de la Russie, si la Porte se voit obligée de lui demander du secours; car d'après les déclarations qui lui ont été faites dans le tems par M. de Ruckman, et dernièrement encore par M. de Bouténéff, ce n'est qu'au cas où elle serait attaquée, que le Traité d'Emirghien* lui donnerait le droit de réclamer son assistance.

(Translation.)

Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extract.)

Constantinople, May 22, 1839.

THE most marked event of the last week is the return of Tahar Pasha from the army. That General-officer, who left this for Malatia on the 5th of April last, arrived in this capital on the 19th of the present month. I have not as yet been able to ascertain what report he has made to the Sultan, nor what will be the results of his mission; I, however, believe that the Porte wishes to afford to itself a delay of some days more, in order to mature the communications which it may wish to make to the foreign Legations.

If I am to believe the official reports which have reached me in this respect, Tahar Pasha must have represented the army as being in the most advantageous position for the commencement of hostilities and for a great blow. According to the same accounts the determination to make war was taken at a Council convoked at the Porte, by order of the Sultan, on the 20th of this month. That which causes me to fear that this is really the course adopted is, that Hosrew Pasha, who has always been opposed to the war, was not at the Council, and was not, as I have been assured, even summoned.

As I foresaw, and as I had the honour of reporting to your Highness at the time of the departure of Tahar Pasha, that officer's mission was evidently only undertaken with a view to gain time, and to free the Porte during six weeks from the demands for explanation of the foreign Missions, to which it stated, that it was unable to give explanations as to its intentions, before that General should have examined with his own eyes the state of affairs, and should have given with his own mouth an exact and detailed account of the same. At present, a communication to be addressed to us collectively, in which the determinations of His Highness are clearly explained, is, it is said, in course of preparation.

The public, which had flattered itself that the efforts of the foreign Powers in favour of the maintenance of peace would not remain without success, is greatly excited since the return of Tahar Pasha; and the report of an impending, perhaps of an already commenced, war is generally believed. The only question remaining is to know from what quarter the aggression will proceed. It is difficult to resolve this question. It is undoubtedly not always he who fires the first shot who ought in justice to be considered as the aggressor; and in such case, the Porte, supposing that the attack were to proceed from its troops, might very well not be so considered. All the world knows the acts of provocation on the part of Mehemet Ali, and the inkings after independence and war which

* Autrement d't de Unk'ar Skélessi.

even last year he manifested. The Porte would consequently have been justified in placing itself on its defence, and in exerting itself to provide the means of opposing vigorous resistance to such attack. Such conduct would have only been prudent and conformable, as well to its dignity, as to its true interests.

The partisans of Mehemet Ali are anxious to throw the blame of aggression on the Porte; they say, that a mistake has been committed in Europe, in accusing the Pasha of Egypt of having advanced his troops to the extreme frontier of Syria, those troops having always been from nine to fifteen leagues removed from that frontier. They moreover say, that although last year he spoke of war and independence, he has since sheathed his sword, paid the tribute which he owed, and has put himself in the right with respect to the Porte, which appeared satisfied with this apparent submission. The armaments which have since been made by the latter, and which have been carried on with so much energy, together with the march of the Ottoman troops to the very frontiers of Syria, can therefore not be imputed to Mehemet Ali, and must be considered as the sole cause of the approaching struggle. These reasons are specious to a certain degree, and cannot be thrown aside without examination.

However this may be, it is to be hoped that, at the point at which matters have now arrived, all the Powers will take the part of the Porte, and will attribute to its embarrassments what may be obscure in the language it holds.

If I have thought it right to advert here to the question of the aggression, it is because the conduct of Russia, in case the Porte should see itself compelled to demand the assistance of that Power, will depend on its solution; for according to the declarations which were made at the time by M. de Ruckman, and latterly again by M. de Bouténéff, it is only in case the Porte should be attacked, that the Treaty of Emirghien* would give to it the right of applying for such assistance.

No. 59.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 17.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 26, 1839.

LATE this evening I received a letter from the Chief Dragoman, who had been sent for in the earlier part of the day to the Sultan's Palace, of which I inclose copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PŌNSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 59.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Péra, ce 26 Mai, 1839.

SAID BEY m'a fait chercher aujourd'hui. Il m'a parlé de l'Affaire Egyptienne. La substance de ce qu'il m'a dit est absolument la même que celle de ce que Nouri Effendi nous a dit dans la dernière conférence; et par conséquent, je me suis tenu dans mes réponses à la lettre de ce que

* Otherwise of Unkiar Skelessi.

(Translation.)

The Duc de Dalmatie to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated by the Baron de Bourqueney.)

Sir,

Paris, June 17, 1839.

I PROCEED to answer the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 14th of this month, marked No. 52.

My preceding despatch will have made you acquainted with the answer of the cabinet of Vienna to our first communications upon the affairs of the East. You will find in the annexed extracts of two despatches from M.M. de Barante and Bresson, the only data which we have as yet with respect to the views of Prussia and Russia. At Berlin, as I have already informed you, they are quite disposed to join for the maintenance of peace in the measures of the other Powers. At St. Petersburg, where our communications had not yet arrived, M. de Barante supposed, from indications which I do not consider decisive, that the Russian Government was inclined to seize every honourable pretext to avoid involving itself in the embarrassments which the execution of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would entail.

The despatches arrived three days since by the packet boat from the Levant, have not brought us news of any importance. The armies were still in presence on the banks of the Euphrates; there had even been a slight skirmish between some soldiers, but nothing indicated a wish on the part of the leaders to come to an engagement. If, moreover, the reports sent by Ibrahim Pasha to his father, are to be believed, the Turks were far from being in a state to commence hostilities. Their army did not amount to more than 36,000 men, and these weakened by the want of sufficient supplies and by desertion. A belief, also, began to be entertained at Alexandria, that there would not be a war: it was even the opinion of the Viceroy. At Constantinople less security was felt, because, through the veil of pacific protestations, the Porte manifested its hostile intentions in the eagerness with which it sought grievances against Mehemet Ali, even in the most trivial circumstances and in the most improbable reports.

I have now sketched the state of things such as it exists at the present moment, that is to say, calculated still to justify very serious anxiety. You will, however, form a more complete judgment upon the matter from the annexed extracts of the correspondence from Egypt and Constantinople.

I will now enable you to answer the enquiries which Lord Palmerston has addressed to you as to the opinion which the Government of the King has formed with respect to the measures to be taken with a view to provide for the exigencies of the moment.

The Government of the King acknowledges the utility and the propriety of a concert between the Great Powers to provide the means of securing, by a common attitude and language, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire; it thinks that the seat of the deliberations to be commenced for this purpose can be the most advantageously established at Vienna.

It is of opinion that, in order to prevent hostilities, if they should not yet have broken out, or to put a stop to them if they should have unfortunately commenced, the English and French squadrons, assuming a sort of armed mediation, should constitute themselves mistresses of the sea: should impose complete inaction upon the naval forces of Egypt and of the Porte, and should induce them to re-enter their harbours in the event of their having left them.

The English squadron appears to amount to ten ships of the line without counting other vessels. Our own will be composed also of ten sail of the line, and will reckon in addition four or five frigates, with at least four steam-vessels, and other lighter vessels. Seven ships of the line are already assembled at Smyrna, or on their way thither. The three others will very soon take their departure. It is important that instructions, not common,

but dictated in the same spirit, and which instructions the two Courts would previously communicate to one another, should be transmitted without delay to the commanders of the two squadrons for the guidance of their operations. When it is known in the East that such forces are acting in the same spirit, and tending to the same end, it is not possible to suppose that either the fleet of the Sultan, or that of the Pasha, will venture to contend against them. I say more: the employment of such forces, by rendering war almost impossible, will deprive Russia of every pretext for putting in movement her Sevastopol fleet or her land army.

In order the better to obtain the result which we have in view, it may perhaps be expedient that the Austrian flag should appear among the combined French and English squadron: one or two frigates with some light vessels will be sufficient for the purpose. It is to be observed, moreover, that Prince Metternich has already expressed this opinion.

Such, Sir, are the measures which, it appears to me, are required to be adopted without delay, if we do not wish to be surprised by events. I now come to the measures which, when the formal deliberations shall be opened between the Cabinets, may be taken in order to put an end to the existing crisis, and to prevent at any time its return.

If our declarations and the attitude of our squadrons should fail in preventing the two parties from coming to hostilities, or in compelling them immediately to cease therefrom, the necessity for a common action by the Great Powers would become evident; and there is no ground for expecting that Russia would, in that case, be induced to refrain from a physical intervention in a question in which her interests would be so directly affected. What should be obtained is, that her course of action be fixed and limited in concert with the other Courts; that she should bind herself to that which France and England would on their part have to exert; in short, it is, in fact, that a European Convention should take the place of the stipulations of Unkiar Skelessi. I am not ignorant of all the obstacles which would be raised to such a plan by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, whose policy has always been to keep its relations with Turkey beyond the pale of European law. It is for the same reason that there are grounds for fearing that that Cabinet will not lend itself to negotiations carried on by means of permanent conferences. It will, however, have few arguments of any force to oppose to combinations evidently suggested by the desire for peace, and supported by all its Allies.

It now remains for me to speak of the final object of these negotiations, of the arrangement by which it might be possible to place the Sultan and his powerful vassal in a situation more satisfactory to both, and more promising for the tranquillity of the East than that in which they have been placed for the last six years.

The necessity of conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of a part at least of his actual possessions, appears to be almost generally admitted. It has been considered that Mehemet Ali, at the degree of eminence which he has reached, would be too strongly impressed with the urgency of providing for the future interests of his family, and of placing them in security from the vengeance of the Porte after his death, to permit himself to entertain really pacific views, until he shall have obtained some satisfaction on this head.

On the other hand, it is not to be hoped that the Porte will consent to grant him this augmentation of moral force, unless some advantage by way of compensation be given to it, which may afford a positive guarantee against the subsequent enterprises of an enemy, whose power it will thus have increased. The nature and the extent of this advantage are not indeed easy to be determined. Lord Palmerston thinks that nothing less than the restitution of the whole of Syria would suffice. At Berlin, it appears to be admitted, that the Sultan might content himself with a part only of this province. With regard to us, Sir, we acknowledge that the Porte would be entitled to a real compensation; but we think that the moment for fixing its nature and its extent has not yet arrived; that such a question can only be solved, according to various and complicated data, the estimation of which cannot be the work of a moment; and that this

point should be referred to the Conference which, if our views prevail, will be established between the Powers.

Be so good, Sir, as to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston. In thus communicating to the Cabinet of London, the whole of our views upon the important circumstances of the moment, we give it an unequivocal pledge of the confidence with which it inspires us, and of the desire which we feel to act with it, in the most perfect accordance. Lord Palmerston will readily understand, that some of the ideas which you are directed to communicate to him are hypothetical, and that events or even more mature reflections may greatly modify them.

Receive, &c.,

(Signed) MARECHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

P.S.—We anxiously await your answer, and the communication which Lord Palmerston will no doubt hasten to make to you of the decision of the Cabinet of London, upon the subject of the common deliberations, of which we propose to establish the seat at Vienna, as well as of the instructions destined for Admiral Stopford.

No. 62.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 19, 1839.

THE inclosed paper contains the substance of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government propose to give to Sir Robert Stopford, the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, and upon which they request the previous opinion of the French Government.

The part of these instructions which relates to the possibility of the English and French squadrons going up to Constantinople in the event of a Russian force entering the Turkish territory, may require some consideration. It seems clear that such a measure would, in such case, be highly desirable, and that it would be the best, if not the only way, of effectually counteracting the bad consequences which might result from the entrance of the Russians into Turkey; but if that movement were to be effected against a vigorous resistance on the part of the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, it would be difficult to accomplish it, unless the fleet were accompanied by some force which could be landed to carry the forts by taking them in the rear. This operation would not be difficult, and would not require any large amount of force; for though the batteries are formidable against ships, on account of the narrowness of the channel, the strength of the current, which sets downwards towards the Mediterranean, and because at this time of year the wind sets chiefly the same way as the current, yet those forts are weak on the land side, and might be taken one after the other, by any moderate force which attacked them in the rear.

It is probable, however, that if the Turkish troops were defeated, and if the Russians had entered Turkey, the Sultan would cheerfully permit, if he did not actually invite, the British and French squadrons to go up to Constantinople; and as those squadrons would come as friends to protect the Sultan, and not as enemies to attack him, it would be difficult for the Russians to suggest to him a plausible reason for refusing to receive such protection.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 62.

Substance of proposed Instructions to Sir Robert Stopford.

THE Admiral to proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other neighbouring part of the coast of Syria which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali may happen to be.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from the Admiralty.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and continued to occupy positions likely to lead to collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the Commander of each army, in doing which he will be assisted by the British Consuls on the coast; and the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to the General of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each General to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the distance between the two armies, and thus to give a security that no collision should take place to interfere with the efforts of the Allied Powers to effect by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the Sultan and his vassal. If the Generals should either or both of them refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of war to Constantinople or Alexandria, or to both, as the case might be, to urge the superior Authorities to send the necessary orders; and he should express to the Generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government, that they should suspend all forward movements till they should hear from their respective Governments; and he should impress upon them the deep responsibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.

If on his arrival off the coast he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the Generals commanding the contending armies, and state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose and strongly to press upon them a suspension of arms. That the British Government, in concert and in co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great importance, for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on; that the views of the Powers with respect to these arrangements must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe; and that, consequently, those views could not be altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce; and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause a useless effusion of blood, without being attended with any permanent advantage to either party; because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the Contending Parties.

If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send off a report thereof to Constantinople and Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave a sufficient space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal Military Convention, and that its duration should be without any

definite limit of time and that a month's notice should be required before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria, that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria, to agree to the suspension of arms.

If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the Sultan; for to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the acknowledged and undoubtedly the rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

But in such case, the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish Commander how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable armistice, when proposed to him by an ally of his master, for the express purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army; and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at the head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to retreat with a defeated army, and be pursued by a victorious enemy; and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities through hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted upon.

If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his purpose; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt; and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to the Pasha of Egypt.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan; but the Admiral would further proceed to employ all the means at his command to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of war, and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose, and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, in a British ship of war, positive orders for an immediate suspension of hostilities. If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should immediately be released; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed, and he might then return to the coast of Syria, to watch events, or might remain off Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing circumstances.

If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency, as he may find necessary, or may think best calculated to accomplish the desired result.

Among the measures to which he might resort, would be a refusal to permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out of port; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.

But it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stay the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing it back within the limits of Syria.

In such an event, it is also possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey with the professed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.

In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory.

There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner this measure could best be executed; and having stated to the Admiral their opinion on this point, Her Majesty's Government must leave it to his discretion, to determine whether, in the event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his command would be strong enough to force the passage without sustaining such an amount of loss in men, and of damage to the ships, as would cripple the squadron and unfit it for any useful operation after the passage had been effected.

If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could, consistently with the execution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the other two fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports. But the first and most important object is to prevent or to put an end to hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences disastrous to the Turkish Empire and fatal to the peace of Europe.

These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for all the cases which can at present be foreseen; but unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required; the Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit, from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.

Orders of a nature similar to these, have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean; and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with Sir Robert Stopford's. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries on these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform.

The Admiral will, therefore, communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show *in extenso* to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments, will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

Les Capitaines du "Scamandre" et du "Dante," dont le "Mentor" m'apporte les rapports, annoncent le commencement des hostilités en Syrie; au départ du "Dante" d'Alexandrie, le 7 Juin apportait la nouvelle de l'invasion du territoire Egyptien par les Turcs qui s'étaient emparés de quinze villages dont les habitans avaient été armés. A cette nouvelle, Ibrahim Pacha avait fait marcher un corps de 25,000 hommes contre eux; des transports étaient partis d'Alexandrie avec des troupes à bord.

L'Escadre Turque était dans le Bosphore au départ du "Scamandre" de Constantinople, le 7 courant, avec 7,000 hommes, qu'on disait devoir opérer un débarquement en Egypte. Le bruit courait à Constantinople qu'une affaire sérieuse, dans laquelle les Turcs avaient été battus, avait eu lieu en Syrie.

Le Grand Seigneur était malade.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Lespach from Marseilles of the 22nd of June, 1839, 11 o'clock.

THE "Minos" started last night for Malta. The "Mentor" arrived at the same time. This last met on the 17th, between Maritimo and Sicily, with the squadron of Admiral Stopford apparently directing its course towards Malta.

The Captains of the "Scamandre" and of the "Dante," whose reports were brought to me by the "Mentor," announce the commencement of hostilities in Syria. At the departure of the "Dante" from Alexandria, news had arrived, on the 7th of June, of the invasion of the Egyptian territory by the Turks, who had possessed themselves of fifteen villages, the inhabitants of which had been armed. On this intelligence Ibrahim Pasha had marched a division of 25,000 men against them; transports had left Alexandria with troops on board. At the departure of the "Scamandre" from Constantinople on the 7th instant, the Turkish squadron was in the Bosphorus with 7,000 men, who, it was reported, were intended to effect a landing in Egypt. A report was current in Constantinople that a serious affair, in which the Turks had been beaten, had taken place in Syria.

The Grand Signor was ill.

No. 69.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1839.

I HAVE received the Queen's commands to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that instructions to the following effect may be forthwith addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Robert Stopford will proceed with the ships under his command to the Bay of Scanderoon, or to any other part of the coast of Syria which may be near to the places where the armies of the Sultan and of Mehemet Ali may happen to be.

If, on arriving off the coast, the Admiral should find that hostilities have not commenced, and that, on the contrary, the two armies have made retrograde movements, and that there is no likelihood of collision, he will then proceed in the execution of such other orders as he may have received from your Lordships.

If he should find that, although hostilities had not actually commenced, the two armies, nevertheless, were near to each other, and continued to occupy positions likely to occasion collision, the Admiral should immediately open a communication with the commander of each army, in doing which he will be assisted by the British Consuls on the coast; and

the best step to take for this purpose would probably be, to send to the general of each army an officer, accompanied by a competent interpreter.

The Admiral should earnestly request each general to withdraw his troops some days' march from their actual position, in order to widen the distance between the two armies; and thus to give a security that no hostile collision should interfere with the efforts of the Allied Powers to effect, by negotiation, a permanent settlement between the Sultan and his vassal. If one or both of the generals should refuse to comply with this request, the Admiral should dispatch a ship of war to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both those places, as the case might be, in order to request the British Ambassador and Consul-General to urge the superior authorities to send the necessary orders; and he should express to the generals the confident and well-founded expectation of the British Government that all operations or forward movements should be suspended till the further orders of their respective Governments should have been received; and he should impress upon the generals the deep responsibility which they would incur by any hasty and inconsiderate step.

If, on his arrival off the coast, he should find that hostilities had already commenced, he should, as in the former supposed case, immediately open a communication with the generals commanding the contending armies, and should state to them that he has been specially sent by the British Government to propose, and strongly to press upon them, a suspension of arms; that the British Government, in concert and co-operation with Her Majesty's Allies, is going to endeavour to bring about, by negotiation, an amicable and a mutually satisfactory arrangement between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt; and that it is of great importance for the success of such negotiation, that the hostilities between the two armies should be suspended while that negotiation is going on; that the views of the Powers with respect to these final arrangements, must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe, and that those views could not be altered by any events which a continuance of hostilities might produce; and that such a continuance of hostilities, therefore, would only cause a useless effusion of blood without being attended with any permanent advantage to either of the Contending Parties. Because the final settlement will depend, not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the two parties.

If the two Generals should accede to the proposed suspension of arms, the Admiral will immediately send a report thereof to Constantinople and to Alexandria, and also, by the shortest way, to England; and he will, at the same time, urgently request the two Generals to withdraw their armies to a certain distance from each other, so as to leave an ample interval of space between their respective troops.

It will also be desirable that the armistice should be confirmed by a formal military convention, and that its duration should be without any definite limit of time; and two months' notice, at the least, should be required, before it could be put an end to by either party.

If either or both of the Generals should refuse to accede to this armistice, the Admiral should, as in the former supposed case, send off to Constantinople, or to Alexandria, or to both, to urge through the Ambassador at Constantinople, and through the Consul-General at Alexandria, that the requisite orders might be sent to the Generals in Syria to agree to the suspension of arms.

If the refusal shall come from the Turkish General, it will, for many reasons, political and physical, be difficult for the Admiral to employ any other means than those of persuasion, to procure the consent of the Sultan. For to say nothing of the position in which Her Majesty stands towards the Sultan, who is Her Majesty's Ally, and who is also the acknowledged and rightful Sovereign of the territory which is the cause of dispute, it is to be borne in mind that the operations of the Sultan's Army do not depend upon any communication by sea between Constantinople and the scene of operations, so that the squadron could not check those operations; and that it would not be easy for the squadron to force

its way up to Constantinople for the purpose of supporting by its presence, the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

But in such case the Admiral would strongly point out to the Turkish Commander, how uncertain are the chances of war, and how great and fearful his responsibility would be, if, after he had refused an honourable armistice, when proposed to him by an Ally of his master, for the express purpose of negotiation, any unforeseen disaster should befall his army; and if, instead of finding himself under the security of an armistice at the head of a strong and unbroken force, he were to be compelled to retreat with a defeated army, and to be pursued by a victorious enemy; and if he should thus bring upon his country the most serious calamities in consequence of hostilities, the continuance of which he had himself insisted upon.

If, on the contrary, the refusal should proceed from the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali, geographical circumstances would enable the Admiral to employ more effectual means to accomplish his purpose; because the Egyptian Army could not well carry on its military operations in Syria without a free communication by sea with Egypt, which communication the squadron could cut off; and because the squadron, by going to Alexandria, could exert a powerful influence in support of the representations which the Consul-General might make to the Pasha of Egypt.

In such case, therefore, the Admiral would employ towards the General commanding the troops of Mehemet Ali in Syria, all the arguments which have been pointed out as applicable to the General of the Sultan; but the Admiral would, in addition, proceed to employ all the means at his command to produce compliance with his request.

For this purpose, he would, in the first place, prevent all further communication by Egyptian vessels, whether of commerce or of war, between Syria and Egypt; he would turn away all Egyptian ships of war; and would send all Egyptian transports and merchantmen to Malta, or to any other place, where they might be held for a time in safe custody. He would then leave on the coast of Syria such ships of war as he might think necessary for this purpose; and would proceed with the rest of his force to Alexandria, and would lose no time in earnestly pressing Mehemet Ali to send to Syria, by a British ship of war, positive orders for an immediate suspension of hostilities.

If Mehemet Ali should comply with this request, all vessels which might have been detained should be released; but the Admiral should remain off Alexandria with his squadron, till he had learnt that the order had actually been obeyed; and he might then return to the coast of Syria to watch events, or he might remain off Alexandria, according to his discretion under the then existing state of circumstances.

If the Pasha should refuse to give the order, the Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency, as he might find necessary, or might think best calculated to accomplish the desired result.

Among the measures to which he might resort would be, a refusal to permit the Egyptian fleet either to come out, if in port, or to go in, if out of port; and he might detain all Egyptian merchantmen, and, according to his discretion, any Egyptian ships of war.

But it might happen, that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing that army back within the limits of Syria.

If the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons should be at sea, the Admiral should endeavour, as far as he could consistently with the execution of the foregoing instructions, to prevent a collision between them, by interposing his squadron in a friendly manner between the Turkish and Egyptian

fleets, and by urging the respective Admirals to retire to their own ports. But the first and most important object is, to prevent or to put an end to hostilities by land, because it is the contest by land, much more than a conflict between the squadrons by sea, that might lead to consequences disastrous to the Turkish Empire, and fatal to the peace of Europe.

These instructions have been prepared with the view of providing for all the cases which can at present be foreseen. But unexpected circumstances may arise, and different measures may be required. The Admiral, therefore, should use his discretion in departing, if he should think fit, from the letter of these instructions, provided he adheres to their spirit.

Orders of a nature similar to these, will probably have been given to the French squadron in the Mediterranean; and that squadron will be instructed to join and co-operate with the squadron of Sir Robert Stopford. The most perfect understanding has been established between the British and French Governments upon the great and important matters to which these instructions relate. The interests of the two countries in these affairs are the same, their views and objects are identical, and their measures will be uniform. The Admiral will therefore communicate, concert, and co-operate with the French Admiral, with the utmost confidence and frankness, upon all matters connected with the execution of these instructions, which he will show *in extenso* to the French Admiral; and Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt, that the same harmony which exists between the two Governments will prevail between their Admirals and squadrons.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 70.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Foreign Office, June 25. 1839.

I HAVE stated in my other letter of this day's date, that among the contingencies which might arise out of the existing state of affairs in the Levant, and with which Admiral Sir Robert Stopford might have to deal, "it might happen that the army of the Sultan might have suffered a great defeat, and that measures of extreme vigour might become necessary to stop the advance of the Egyptians, and to save the Turkish Empire. In this case, the Admiral would be authorized to have recourse to any measures of compulsion which he might think to be within his means, and which he might consider likely to induce the Pasha to give the necessary orders for stopping the advance of his army, and for bringing it back within the limits of Syria."

I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure, that a further instruction be addressed to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford with reference to the above-mentioned contingency, and to the following effect:

Sir Robert Stopford should be informed that, in such an event, it is possible that a Russian force, either naval or military, might enter the ports and territory of Turkey, with the professed object of protecting the Sultan, and of repelling the Egyptian invaders.

In such a case, and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain either there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces should have evacuated the Turkish territory.

There would be time for the Admiral to communicate on this matter with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner this measure could best be executed; and Her Majesty's Government having stated to the Admiral their opinion on this point, must leave it to his discretion to determine whether, in the event of permission to pass not being granted, the force under his com-

Avant tout, il nous faut maîtriser les faits, c'est-à-dire, empêcher que la lutte ne devienne menaçante pour le repos de l'Europe entière.

Lorsque nous aurons une fois atteint ce but, les circonstances se simplifieront d'elles-mêmes; alors on jugera avec plus de maturité quelle sera l'issue du combat et quels devront être les arrangements ultérieurs qui pourront intervenir entre les deux parties, afin de rétablir les relations pacifiques de la Porte avec le Pacha d'Egypte sur une base solide et durable.

Pour le moment, notre prévoyance doit se borner à aller au plus pressé, c'est-à-dire à empêcher que la politique mal dirigée du Sultan ne puisse nous entraîner dans une complication qui soit de nature à amener la chance d'un conflit Européen.

C'est ce danger que nous sommes intéressés à éloigner de tous nos efforts; et c'est dans cette vue qu'il nous a semblé indispensable de nous expliquer franchement avec l'Angleterre, en faisant à Londres la démarche dont je viens, d'ordre de l'Empereur, de vous indiquer le but et le plan. Elle prouvera au Ministère Britannique, que loin de vouloir provoquer une complication dans le Levant, nous employons tous nos soins à la prévenir; et qu'au lieu de nous prévaloir avec empressement des stipulations de notre Traité d'Alliance avec la Porte, nous sommes les premiers à désirer nous-mêmes d'éloigner le renouvellement d'une crise qui nous forcerait, malgré nous, à reprendre une attitude militaire sur les rives du Bosphore.

La certitude que l'Angleterre acquerra par là de nos intentions vraiment conservatrices, ne saurait manquer d'exercer une influence utile sur les dispositions du Cabinet de Londres. Il appréciera, je l'espère, la loyauté des sentimens qui a dicté la démarche dont vous allez vous acquitter. Veuillez ne pas tarder un seul instant. M. le Comte, à nous informer de l'accueil qu'elle aura obtenu de la part de Lord Palmerston. L'Empereur se plaît à croire que cet accueil répondra pleinement à nos vœux, et que l'entente qui s'établira entre le Cabinet Anglais et le nôtre, pour le maintien de la paix du Levant, servira à la faire rétablir promptement, lors-même que la politique imprévoyante du Divan aurait tenté de la troubler momentanément.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(Communicated by M. de Kisseleff, June 27, 1839.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 15, 1839.

THE last despatches from Constantinople of the 1st May, and from Alexandria of the 3rd May, apprise us that the Ottoman and Egyptian troops had approached so near to each other that a conflict between them appeared imminent. This supposition seems to us the more probable, because the movement of Hafiz Pasha upon Bir, situated at the extremity of the frontiers of Syria, appears to indicate that it entered really into the views of the Sultan, all the while declaring his pacific intentions, to cause the Army of the Taurus to advance to such a point as to render a conflict inevitable, by attributing it to some chance circumstance, without the Porte appearing to have given any provocation for it.

M. de Bouténéff, at the date of his last reports, was continuing to employ all his efforts to dissuade the Sultan from the notion of precipitating himself into a struggle, the consequences of which might become so serious to the repose of the Ottoman Empire. It may be that the remonstrances of our Minister, joined to those of his Colleagues, have succeeded in preventing a complication which seemed at hand. In this case, the danger which appeared to threaten the repose of the East will have once again been averted; in the same manner as it was just a year ago, thanks to the unanimity which then presided at the determinations of the Great Powers of Europe.

But it is also possible that events may have now proceeded with too great

rapidity for the efforts of the Allied Representatives to have succeeded in arresting the execution of a plan of aggression, which the Porte appears to have meditated for a long time, and which it has contrived to veil in the most profound mystery.

At the distance at which we are from the scene of events, the remonstrances which we might now address to the Porte would certainly be somewhat late; we should be unable to prevent a struggle, which is perhaps at the present moment already begun. There remains but one task for us to fulfil, that is, to confine this struggle within the narrowest possible bounds, so that it may not compromise the maintenance of the general repose of Europe.

I will explain this idea clearly, and recapitulate in a few words the practical consequences which attach to it.

The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried on in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Pasha of Egypt.

Neither would there be danger to Europe if the Sultan succeeded in reconquering Syria, as he wishes and hopes to do. The danger would not begin to become serious until, in the event of the fate of arms declaring against the Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this advantage to place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the Ottoman Empire in peril.

That would be the true and only danger for the continuance of general peace, for from the moment that Constantinople should be threatened, the question would cease to be considered simply as one between the Porte and Egypt. There would no longer be question of a struggle between two Mussulman forces,—there would be question of a European complication, which from that moment would appear to us to be imminent.

To prevent things reaching such a point, it is of consequence to take measures in time for confining the struggle between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali within certain limits, in order that this struggle may in no case extend itself so as to compromise the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

With this view it has appeared to us essential to come to an understanding, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just pointed out. Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably the one that can exercise the greatest influence over the fate of this question, and can co-operate in the most decisive manner in realising the pacific intentions of our august Master.

With this conviction His Majesty desires you, Sir, to come to an explanation with the British Cabinet, on this subject, without the least reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet, that it is as much for its interest as for ours, to take care that the struggle between the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so serious a character as may ever place the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire in danger;

That in order to avoid such a catastrophe, we should be prepared,
1st. To prevent the fleet of the Pasha of Egypt from coming out of port;
2dly. Not to allow the Egyptian Army, if it met with decided successes as was the case in 1833, to advance, as at that period, to the centre of Asia Minor, even to the gates of Constantinople;

That consequently, in order, beforehand, to set due bounds to the action of the Pasha of Egypt,—bounds clearly defined which he is not to be permitted to transgress with impunity,—it would be necessary to declare to him in the most formal manner, "That as long as he shall confine himself to the defence of the territories which have been assigned to him by the arrangement of Kutaya: as long as he shall not extend his military operations beyond the district of Diarbekir and Orfa, as he has formally promised to the Allied Consuls, so long will Great Britain, in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle which is going on in Syria; but that from the instant he shall act on the offensive, from the moment that he shall extend the theatre of the war beyond the defiles of

the Taurus in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she were at open war with the Pasha of Egypt;

"That in the same manner she would consider herself in a state of war with him, if he attempted to send out his fleet to enter upon a naval contest with the Sultan; the formal intention of England being to confine the contest within the limits of Syria, and not to permit it, under any pretence, to pass those limits, fixed irrevocably by the general interest of Europe, which desires that the peace of the East may be promptly re-established, and that the present struggle, whatever may be the chances of the war, shall in no manner place the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire in jeopardy."

If England came to an agreement with us to issue a declaration couched in these terms, the Emperor would authorize his Representative at Alexandria to hold precisely the same language.

The other Allied Courts would doubtless hasten to unite their efforts to those of Russia and of England.

The harmony which would thus preside over the determinations of the Five Powers, might once again preserve Europe from the misfortune of a general conflagration in the Levant, by confining, as it may be said, the two adversaries in closed lists, compelling them to settle their quarrel in Syria, without permitting them to engage on a wider field, from which it is the general interest of Europe to keep them off in spite of themselves.

If we succeed in obtaining the result which I have described; if the English Government accepts the ideas which your Excellency is directed to communicate to it; if we thus prevent the fleet of Mehemet Ali from coming out of his ports; and if we forbid his army from crossing the Taurus, under penalty of finding himself at war with the whole of Europe, we shall have obtained all that is necessary to prevent a serious complication in the Levant.

Above all things, we must be able to bring the matter within our control, that is to say, prevent the struggle from becoming threatening to the repose of all Europe.

When once we shall have attained this end, circumstances will simplify themselves of their own accord; a more mature judgment can then be formed as to the issue of the combat, and as to what the ulterior arrangements which may be made between the two parties ought to be, in order to re-establish the pacific relations of the Porte with the Pasha of Egypt upon a solid and durable basis.

For the moment, we must confine ourselves to what is most pressing, that is to say, to guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging us into a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European conflict.

It is this danger which we are interested in removing with all our endeavours; and it is with this view that we have thought it indispensable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking in London the step of which, by the Emperor's orders, I have pointed out to you the plan and the object. It will prove to the British Ministry that, far from wishing to bring about a complication in the Levant, we are using all our care to prevent one; and that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves the first to desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel us, in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the shores of the Bosphorus.

The certainty which England will thereby acquire of our truly conservative intentions, cannot fail to exercise a salutary influence over the disposition of the Cabinet of London. It will, I hope, appreciate the sincerity of the sentiments which has dictated the step which you are about to take. Have the goodness, Sir, not to delay a moment in informing us of the reception it meets with from Lord Palmerston. The Emperor flatters himself, that this reception will fully answer our wishes, and that the understanding which will be established between the

English Cabinet and our own for the preservation of the peace of the Levant, will serve speedily to re-establish it, even if the short-sighted policy of the Divan should have attempted momentarily to disturb it.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 75.

Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant.—(Communicated by
M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)

M. le Contre-Amiral,

Paris, le 26 Juin, 1839.

DEJA quelques actes d'hostilité paraissent avoir eu lieu en Syrie, entre les troupes du Sultan et celles du Vice-Roi d'Egypte. Un puissant intérêt Européen existe à prévenir ou arrêter les effets d'une collision, et c'est là le but que se propose la France, aidée de ses Alliées; c'est celui que vous devez chercher à atteindre avec l'escadre sous votre commandement, soit isolément, soit par votre co-opération avec l'escadre de Sa Majesté Britannique et avec la station navale d'Autriche dans le Levant, si, comme il y a tout lieu de le croire, cette station a l'ordre de se joindre aux forces navales Françaises et Anglaises. Vous aurez donc à vous concerter avec leurs commandans, sur les moyens de rendre la co-opération efficace. De son côté, sans doute, Sir Robert Stopford aura reçu des instructions conformes à l'intérêt puissant qu'ont les deux pays dans la conduite d'une affaire dans laquelle leurs vues et leur but sont identiques, et leurs mesures doivent être semblables.

Il doit donc y avoir entre les deux amiraux communication réciproque de leurs instructions, et il doit s'établir entre eux toute la confiance et toute la franchise propres à amener dans leurs opérations le même accord qui existe entre les deux Gouvernemens. Lorsque le cas exigera concert et co-opération, la direction supérieure appartiendra à l'officier le plus élevé ou le plus ancien en grade.

A la réception des présentes instructions, l'escadre sous vos ordres devra se diriger vers les côtes de Syrie.

Dans le cas de la rencontre des escadres Turque et Egyptienne, vous vous attacherez à rendre impossible une collision, en vous interposant entre elles, et en pressant les amiraux de rentrer dans leurs ports respectifs; et vous empêcherez tout arrivage de troupes et de munitions de guerre, par mer, sur le théâtre de la guerre.

Vous devrez chercher à vous mettre immédiatement en communication avec les deux généraux-en-chef, soit dans la baie d'Alexandrette, soit sur tout autre point le plus rapproché des lieux occupés par les deux armées.

Vous ferez tous vos efforts pour leur faire proposer et accepter une suspension d'armes, pendant laquelle les Puissances entreront en négociation pour amener un arrangement mutuellement satisfaisant pour la Porte et pour le Pacha d'Egypte. Il convient de faire remarquer, que cet arrangement devant être fondé sur une large appréciation des grands intérêts de l'Europe, et non pas sur les éventualités de la guerre, aucune des deux parties n'a intérêt à continuer les hostilités qui, quelle qu'en fût l'issue, ne pourraient, en définitive, améliorer sa situation; il sera également important d'insister pour que les deux armées se retirent à une certaine distance l'une de l'autre.

L'armistice sera constaté par une Convention militaire portant que la reprise des hostilités, si elle avait lieu, devrait être dénoncée au moins un mois à l'avance.

Ces démarches, ces dispositions, soit qu'elles proviennent d'un des deux commandans des escadres agissant isolément, soit, en cas de réunion des deux escadres, qu'elles aient lieu de concert et avec la participation de l'un et de l'autre, ces dispositions, dis-je, devront être portées immédiatement à la connaissance de notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, et

du Consul-Général à Alexandrie, et l'avis en sera transmis en France par la voie la plus prompte.

Si les deux généraux, ou l'un d'eux, se refusaient à accéder à cet armistice, l'Ambassadeur à Constantinople et le Consul-Général à Alexandrie en seraient immédiatement informés, comme dans le cas précédent, afin qu'ils eussent à réclamer l'envoi aux généraux en Syrie, des ordres nécessaires pour les faire consentir à la suspension d'armes.

Si le refus venait du général Turc, on appellerait son attention sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait en cas de revers. Il lui serait signifié que dès ce moment, la voie de mer serait fermée à tout secours destiné à l'Armée Ottomane, tandis que notre Ambassadeur, informé du refus, agirait auprès du Sultan pour vaincre cette résistance.

Si le refus, au contraire, provenait du général Egyptien, des représentations analogues lui seraient faites, et toute communication maritime entre la Syrie et l'Egypte serait immédiatement fermée.

Dans l'un ou l'autre cas, les deux amiraux se concerteraient sur la répartition des forces qu'il serait nécessaire de placer soit à l'entrée du détroit, soit devant Alexandrette, soit enfin sur tel point du territoire de l'Asie Mineure qui serait jugé convenable pour y établir un blocus étroitement serré, et ne permettre la sortie d'aucun bâtiment de guerre ou autre.

Outre le concert établi entre les commandans des escadres Française et Anglaise, et même le commandant de la station Autrichienne, il serait possible qu'une escadre Russe offrit son concours; il doit être bien entendu qu'il serait admis dans un but pacifique et conforme aux présentes instructions.

Ces instructions ont pour but, de pourvoir aux éventualités qui ont pu être actuellement prévues. Il en est d'autres qui, par leur nature et leur gravité, exigeront des instructions ultérieures: elles vous seront adressées. Le Roi s'en rapporte, pour tout le reste, au zèle et à l'habileté du Commandant de son escadre, aidé de ses connaissances locales, et de la vieille expérience de l'illustre amiral avec lequel il va se trouver en rapports de service.

(Translation.)

Instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant.—(Communicated by M. de Bourqueney, June 29.)

M. le Contre-Amiral.

Paris, June 26, 1839.

ALREADY some acts of hostility appear to have taken place in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of Egypt. An important European interest is at stake to prevent or arrest the effects of a collision, and this is the object which France proposes to effect with the assistance of her Allies; it is this which you are to endeavour to attain with the squadron under your command, either separately or by your co-operation with the squadron of Her Britannic Majesty, and with the naval division of Austria in the Levant, if, as there is every reason to believe, this division has received orders to join the French and English naval forces. You will, therefore, have to concert with their commanders upon the means of rendering the co-operation efficacious. Sir Robert Stopford on his side will, no doubt, have received instructions in conformity with the important interest which the two countries have in the management of an affair in which their views and their object are identical, and in which their measures should be similar.

The two Admirals should, therefore, reciprocally communicate to each other their instructions, and should act towards each other with all the confidence and frankness requisite to introduce into their operations the same unanimity which subsists between the two Governments. Whenever circumstances may require concert and co-operation, the chief direction will belong to the officer of the highest rank or of the longest standing.

Upon the receipt of these instructions, the squadron under your orders should proceed towards the coast of Syria.

In the event of a meeting between the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons, you will endeavour to render a collision impossible, by interposing yourself between them, and by urging the Admirals to re-enter their respective ports; and you will prevent any arrival by sea, at the theatre of war, of troops and warlike stores.

You will seek to place yourself immediately in communication with the two Generals-in-Chief, either in the Bay of Scanderoon, or at any other point the nearest to the places occupied by the two armies.

You will exert every effort to induce them to propose and agree to a suspension of arms, during which the Powers will enter into negotiation in order to bring about an arrangement mutually satisfactory for the Porte and for the Pasha of Egypt. It is proper to remark that, as this arrangement must be founded upon an enlarged consideration of the great interests of Europe, and not upon the chances of the war, neither of the two parties has any interest in continuing hostilities which, whatever may be their issue, cannot ultimately improve their situation. It is equally important to require that the two armies should retire to a certain distance from each other.

The armistice shall be confirmed by a military Convention, stipulating that the renewal of hostilities, if it takes place, should be notified at least one month beforehand.

These measures and these arrangements, whether proceeding from one of the two Commanders of the squadrons acting individually, or resulting, in case of a junction of the two squadrons, from the concert and participation of both Commanders, should be immediately communicated to our Ambassador at Constantinople and Consul-General at Alexandria, and information thereof should be forwarded to France by the most expeditious channel.

If the two Generals, or either of them, should refuse to agree to this armistice, the Ambassador at Constantinople and the Consul-General at Alexandria should be immediately informed thereof, as in the preceding case, in order that they may urge the transmission of the necessary orders to the Generals in Syria to consent to a suspension of arms.

If the refusal should come from the Turkish General, his attention should be directed to the serious responsibility which he would incur in case of a reverse. It should be pointed out to him that from that moment communication by sea would be closed to all succours destined for the Ottoman Army; whilst our Ambassador, informed of his refusal, would exert himself with the Sultan to overcome this resistance.

If the refusal, on the contrary, should come from the Egyptian General, similar representations should be made to him, and all communication by sea between Egypt and Syria should be immediately cut off.

In either case, the two Admirals should concert as to the distribution of the forces which it may be necessary to place either at the entrance of the Straits, or off Scanderoon, or in short, at any point of the territory of Asia Minor which may be considered expedient for the maintenance of a strict blockade, and for preventing the departure of any vessel, either of war or of any other description.

Besides the concert established between the Commanders of the French and English squadrons, and also between them and the Commander of the Austrian naval division, it is possible that a Russian squadron may tender its co-operation; it must be well understood that its co-operation should be admitted for a pacific object and in conformity with the present instructions.

These instructions are intended to provide for contingencies which it has been possible to foresee. There are other contingencies which from their nature and their importance require ulterior instructions: those instructions will be addressed to you. The King relies in every other respect upon the zeal and ability of the Commander of his squadron, aided by his local knowledge, and upon the practised experience of the illustrious Admiral with whom he is about to act.

Sub-Inclosure in Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Extrait des Rapports qui sont parvenus de Syrie à la date du 15, du 16, et du 17, Rebi-el-evel, 1255.

LES quatorze villages du district d'Ouront dans la Province d'Antab, ont été occupés par des troupes de Hafiz Pacha. Il a distribué aux habitans de ces villages des armes et des munitions de guerre. Il s'est fait présenter les vieillards de ces mêmes villages; il leur a donné des habits d'honneur. Trois cavaliers Arabes, Hanadis, ont été pris par les habitans de ces villages, qui se sont empressés de les conduire près de Hafiz Pacha, pour en recevoir le backehiche (pour-boire) promis en outre. Hafiz Pacha a donné l'ordre à ses troupes, que s'ils rencontrent des soldats Egyptiens, de les arrêter ou bien de faire feu sur eux. On a fait tirer à Nézib des coups de canon pour annoncer l'arrivée de Hafiz Pacha dans la dite ville. On a fait courir des bruits qu'Ibrahim Pacha ne peut plus avancer; qu'il sera obligé de se reculer devant les troupes Turques jusqu'au Caire; et que le Pacha qui se trouve à Mouche, va désertier et venir près de Hafiz Pacha avec la moitié des soldats qui sont sous son commandement; qu'un Pacha avec onze régimens vient du côté de Malatia, et qu'aussitôt ces régimens arrivés, Hafiz Pacha marchera vers Antab, dans l'armée duquel se trouvent déjà 140 pièces d'artillerie. En outre, on a intimidé les habitans des villes et des villages, en répandant des bruits que le village qui ne se soumettra pas à tems à l'autorité de Hafiz Pacha, hommes, femmes et enfans, tous seront passés au fil de l'épée; le village de Ouront est occupé par une partie de leur cavalerie; le Chef de ce même village a été appelé par Hafiz Pacha; il lui a fait cadeau d'une montre en or. Lorsque ce chef d'Ouront était de retour à son village, il a fait venir tous les vieillards des villages du district, et leur a enjoint de repousser les soldats Egyptiens. Il a fait réunir les habitans de quatre ou cinq villages dans un seul; il leur a distribué des fusils et de la poudre que Hafiz Pacha lui avait envoyés.

Son Altesse Ibrahim Pacha, par sa lettre du 17 Rebi-el-evel, mande en outre, que le Pacha qui se trouve à Marache, excite aussi la population de Kourd Dak; qu'on a remarqué un des chefs des troupes de ce même Pacha parmi la tribu Kourde qui avait saccagé Boulanick; qu'on répand le bruit qu'on a à Koniah 16,000 hommes; à Gifté-kan autant sous le commandement de Ali Pacha de Koniah; qu'on va recruter 8,000 hommes encore dans ces contrées; qu'on a 20,000 hommes à Caramanie; et qu'on dit que toutes ces troupes sont destinées pour le Kuluk-Bogaz. Un autre corps d'armée marchera vers la Syrie par le district de Nijdé. Le corps d'armée fort de onze régimens, marchera pour Kaisserie; le Pacha de Marache avec autant de Kourdes et des canons, &c., &c.

En répandant tous ces bruits, on espère pouvoir exciter la population, comme on l'a déjà fait dans la Province d'Antab.

J'apprends à l'instant par deux exprès de Magioun Bey, que cinq escadrons de la Cavalerie Turque ont attaqué le corps de Cavalerie Arabe sous le commandement du dit Bey, à Tel-Béchir. Notre cavalerie n'a pu résister à leur choc, attendu qu'elle était inférieure en nombre, et que la Cavalerie Turque était suivie de près par des régimens d'Infanterie. Pour empêcher que leurs intrigues et leurs menées ne soient pas communiquées aux environs d'Alep, je me suis décidé à aller à leur rencontre, et je suis arrivé à Tel-Chaïr avec sept régimens de Cavalerie, et douze batteries d'Artillerie à cheval, en laissant l'ordre au Général Solyman Pacha de me suivre avec le corps d'armée.

(Translation.)

Extract of Reports from Syria, dated the 15th, 16th, and 17th of Rebi-el-evel, 1255.

THE fourteen villages of the district of Ouront in the province of Aintab have been occupied by the troops of Hafiz Pasha. He has distri-

buted arms and ammunition to the inhabitants of these villages. He has caused the elders of these same villages to be presented to him; he has given them dresses of honour. Three Arab Horsemen, Hanadis, have been captured by the inhabitants of these villages, who hastened to carry them before Hafiz Pasha, in order to receive from him the promised reward. Hafiz Pasha has ordered his troops, if they fall in with Egyptian soldiers, to capture them, or to fire upon them. Cannon were fired at Nezib to announce the arrival of Hafiz Pasha in that town. Reports have been spread, that Ibrahim Pasha can no longer advance; that he will be obliged to retreat before the Turkish troops as far as Cairo; and that the Pasha who is at Moosh is about to desert, and join Hafiz Pasha with half the soldiers under his orders; that a Pasha with eleven regiments is coming from the direction of Malatia; and that as soon as these regiments arrive, Hafiz Pasha, with whose army there are already 140 guns, will march towards Aintab. Moreover, the inhabitants of the towns and villages have been intimidated by reports that the men, women, and children of any village which shall not submit in good time to the authority of Hafiz Pasha, shall be all put to the sword; the village of Ouront is occupied by a part of their Cavalry; the Chief of that same village was summoned by Hafiz Pasha, who gave him a gold watch. When this Chief of Ouront returned to his village, he convened all the elders of the villages of the district, and enjoined them to drive back the Egyptian soldiers. He collected into one village the inhabitants of four or five villages, and distributed to them some muskets and powder which Hafiz Pasha had sent to him.

His Highness Ibrahim Pasha, in his letter of the 17th of Rebi-el-evel, further reports, that the Pasha of Marash also is stirring up the population of Kourd Dak; that one of the superior officers of that Pasha's troops has been noticed among the tribe of Koords who plundered Boulanick; that it is reported that there 16,000 men at Koniah; as many at Gifté-kan under the orders of Ali Pasha of Koniah; that 8,000 more men are about to be raised in those countries; that there are 20,000 men in Caramania; and that all these troops are reported to be destined for the Kuluk-Bogaz. Another corps will march towards Syria by the district of Nijde. The corps, consisting of eleven regiments, will march for Kaisserieh; the Pasha of Marash with as many Koords, and the guns, &c., &c.

It is hoped that, by spreading these reports, the people may be stirred up, as has already been done in the province of Aintab.

I learn this moment by two expresses from Maggiun Bey, that five squadrons of Turkish Cavalry have attacked the corps of Arab Cavalry under the orders of that Bey at Tel-Bechir. Our Cavalry could not withstand the shock, being inferior in number, and the Turkish Cavalry being closely followed by some regiments of Infantry. In order to prevent their intrigues and machinations from being extended to the neighbourhood of Aleppo, I decided upon advancing to meet them, and I arrived at Tel-Chaïr with seven regiments of Cavalry, and twelve batteries of Horse Artillery, leaving orders for Solyman Pasha to follow me with the main body.

No. 81.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, June 28, 1839.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received from Prince Esterhazy, from M. Kisseleff, and from the French Government, important, and generally speaking, satisfactory, communications upon the subject of the present state of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; and the result of these communications leads Her Majesty's Government to conclude, that the views taken of

these matters by the Austrian, French, and Russian Governments, may be stated shortly to be nearly as follows :—

All three of those Governments appear to be strongly impressed with the necessity of preventing, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, or of putting a speedy end to those hostilities, if they should unfortunately have already broken out; and in that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur. The Russian Government, however, in a despatch of which M. Kisseleff gave me yesterday a copy, states, that the Powers of Europe might be contented to remain passive spectators of the continuance of those hostilities, so long as the Contending Parties should carry on their conflict within the limits of Syria. But in this view, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree; because it is not so much the scene of action, as the possible result of the conflict, which may exercise a decisive influence on the great interests of Europe, and a signal defeat and dispersion of the army of the Sultan, would be scarcely less disastrous on one side of the Taurus, or of the Euphrates, than upon the other.

Your Excellency will see, by the instructions given to Sir Robert Stopford, and which you are authorized to read to Prince Metternich, that Her Majesty's Government consider, that if hostilities shall have begun, and if the Egyptian Troops shall have advanced into Asia Minor, the first object to be aimed at, will be, to procure a suspension of arms, and to cause the Egyptian Troops to return within the limits of Syria; and, therefore, it is unnecessary to state that Her Majesty's Government are not willing to consent that Mehemet Ali should continue to occupy the districts of Diarbekir and Orfa;—districts beyond the Province of Syria, of considerable importance in a military and political point of view, and which it has long been the desire of Mehemet Ali to acquire.

Upon the first point, then, connected with these affairs, there appears to be a general concurrence of opinion, that hostilities between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ought to be prevented or stopped. Austria, France, and England, seem also to feel that the present relative position of the Sultan and the Pasha is incompatible with the safety of the Turkish Empire, and with the peace of Europe; and that some different arrangement must be arrived at, in order to avoid serious and extensive dangers.

Some parts of Count Nesselrode's despatch, might, perhaps, be construed to imply that Russia is not of this opinion, and is satisfied with the present state of things; but there are other passages which appear to indicate that Russia is not disinclined to take into consideration the possibility of making some more permanent settlement. France, Austria, and Great Britain, have expressed a decided opinion that some such settlement is absolutely required for the safety of Europe, and that the Great Powers ought, without loss of time, to enter into communication with each other for that purpose. Prussia would of course concur in such a proceeding; and, although Russia has hitherto endeavoured to retain within her own discretion, everything belonging to her relations with Turkey, yet the Cabinet of Petersburg must clearly see that the general interests of all the Powers of Europe are so directly concerned in the fate of the Turkish Empire, that no one Power can separate herself from the rest in her dealings with respect to Turkey; but that Turkish affairs must henceforward be considered to be as much an European question, as any other affairs with which the Cabinets of Europe have been occupied.

The French Government proposed that these matters should be discussed in a Conference of the Five Powers, to be held at Vienna. Prince Metternich has stated reasons why, in his opinion, these matters cannot properly be submitted to a formal conference, but he has proposed that Vienna should be the seat of negotiation on these affairs. Her Majesty's Government saw many strong reasons in favour of the French proposal, and some of much weight against it; the proposal of Prince Metternich is open to fewer objections, and holds out less advantages.

The informal negotiation proposed by Austria would certainly not fetter the action of Great Britain as much as a formal conference would do.

Her Majesty's Government, however, are willing to agree to the pro-

position of Prince Metternich, provided it shall be acceded to by Russia and Prussia, as well as by Great Britain and France; and I have great satisfaction in stating to your Excellency, that one strong motive which leads Her Majesty's Government to acquiesce in this arrangement is, the entire confidence which they place in your ability, discretion, and firmness.

The general view which Her Majesty's Government, as at present informed, entertain of the affair in question, may be stated as follows:

The Great Powers are justified in interfering in these matters, which are, in fact, a contest between a sovereign and his subject, because this contest threatens to produce great and imminent danger to the deepest interests of other Powers, and to the general peace of Europe. Those interests and that peace require the maintenance of the Turkish Empire; and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, the primary object to be aimed at. This object cannot be secured without putting an end to future chances of collision between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. But as long as Mehemet Ali continues to occupy Syria, there will be danger of such collision. Mehemet Ali cannot hold Syria without a large military force constantly stationed there. As long as there is an Egyptian force in Syria, there must necessarily be a Turkish army in that part of Asia Minor which borders on Syria. Each party might agree at present to reduce those forces to a given amount, but neither could be sure that the other was not, after a time, secretly increasing his amount of force; and each party would, beyond a doubt, gradually augment his own force; and thus, at no distant period, the same state of things which has existed of late, would again recur: for the motives and passions which have led to it would still be in action. Mehemet Ali, or Ibrahim, would still desire to add more territory to their Pashalics; the Sultan would still burn to drive them back into Egypt.

It appears then to Her Majesty's Government, that there can be no end to the danger with which these affairs menace the peace of Europe, until Mehemet Ali shall have restored Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan; shall have retired into Egypt; and shall have interposed the Desert between his troops and authorities and the troops and authorities of the Sultan. But Mehemet Ali could not be expected to consent to this, unless some equivalent advantage were granted to him; and this equivalent advantage might be hereditary succession in his family to the Pashalic of Egypt: Mehemet Ali and his descendants being secured in the Government of that Province in the same way that a former Pasha of Scutari and his family were so secured; the Pasha continuing to be the vassal of the Porte, paying a reasonable tribute, furnishing a contingent of men, and being bound like any other Pasha by the treaties which his sovereign might make. Such an arrangement would appear to be equitable between the parties, because, on the one hand, it would secure the Sultan against the many dangers and inconveniences which arise from the present occupation of Syria by the Pasha; while, on the other hand, it would afford to the Pasha that security as to the future fate of his family, his anxiety about which, he has often declared to be the main cause of his desire to obtain some final and permanent arrangement.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that if the Five Powers were to agree upon such a plan, and were to propose it to the two parties, with all the authority which belongs to the Great Powers of Europe, such an arrangement would be carried into effect, and through its means, Europe would be delivered from a great and imminent danger.

No. 82.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, June 29, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna² ac-

* See No. 81.

Your Excellency will communicate the substance of this despatch to the French Government.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 124.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 15, 1839.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 12th of July.

The inclosed copies of telegraphic despatches which were received here on Saturday by the French Government, were sent to me on Saturday evening by Marshal Sout.

The more detailed reports from Admiral Roussin and from the French Consul at Alexandria, had not reached Paris at the time I saw Marshal Soult this day, but are expected to arrive to-night or to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.

Le Consul de France à M. le Président du Conseil.

Alexandrie, le 26 Juin.

UN courrier arrivé aujourd'hui du quartier-général d'Ibrahim, annonce à Méhémet Ali que l'attaque contre l'Armée Turque devait avoir lieu le 21 Juin.

(Translation.)

The Consul of France to the President of the Council.

Alexandria, June 26.

A COURIER arrived to-day from the head-quarters of Ibrahim, reports to Mehemet Ali that the attack on the Turkish army was to take place on the 21st of June.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Telegraphic Despatch of 13th July, 3 A.M.

ON mande de Constantinople, que le Sultan est gravement malade; qu'il ne s'occupe plus des affaires; et que les médecins avaient déclaré que son existence ne pourrait pas se prolonger plus de trois mois.

Le 26 Juin, on parlait à Alexandrie d'une bataille qui aurait eu lieu le 21, entre les Egyptiens et les Turcs, mais on n'avait pas de détails, et l'on attendait avec impatience le paquebot de Beyrout.

La flotte Turque qui devait sortir le 24, était encore, le 28, dans le détroit des Dardanelles; on attribuait ce tems d'arrêt à la maladie du Sultan.

L'Amiral Lalande avait envoyé le "Trident," "l'Hercule," et le "Jupiter," à Ourlac et se trouvait avec "l'Jéna" seulement à Ténédos.

L'Escadre Anglaise, composée de sept vaisseaux, deux frégates, une corvette, deux bricks, et un bateau à vapeur, a quitté Malte le 2 Juillet, se dirigeant sur l'Egypte et la Syrie.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch of 13th July, 3 A.M

IT is reported from Constantinople that the Sultan is seriously ill; that he no longer busies himself about affairs; and that the physicians had declared that his existence cannot be prolonged beyond three months.

The 26th of June, there was a rumour at Alexandria of a battle having taken place on the 21st between the Egyptians and the Turks, but the details had not been received, and the packet from Beyrout was looked for with impatience.

The Turkish fleet, which was to go out on the 24th, was still, on the 28th, within the straits of the Dardanelles; this detention was attributed to the illness of the Sultan.

Admiral Lalande had sent the "Trident," the "Hercules," and the "Jupiter," to Vourla, and was alone with the "Jena" at Tenedos.

The English squadron, composed of seven sail of the line, two frigates, one corvette, two brigs, and one steam-vessel, left Malta on the 2nd of July, proceeding towards Egypt and Syria.

No. 125.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17.)

(Extract.)

Paris, July 15, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT, this morning, informed me that he has written a despatch to M. de Bourqueney, to be communicated to your Lordship, in which he has authorized the French Chargé d'Affaires to declare the readiness of the French Government to become a party to a general guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Great European Powers. His Excellency indeed dwelt at some length upon the advantages of such a self-denying engagement.

The Marshal then spoke to me of a conversation you had had with M. de Bourqueney, and said to me that he agreed with your Lordship, that if any Russian ships should propose to join the combined fleets of England, of France, and of Austria, upon the Syrian coast, their being permitted to pass through the Dardanelles for that purpose should be considered as a *cas exceptionnel*;—a case in which the deviation from the established principle of shutting the straits, would be counterbalanced by the advantage of manifesting that all the Great Powers acted in concert.

With reference to the Sultan's death, and the possible disturbance of the public tranquillity, the Marshal was of opinion that the Ambassadors, in case they apprehended danger to the lives and properties of their countrymen, might call upon the Admirals to station one or two frigates near Constantinople for their protection, and which might be used as a place of refuge even for the young Sultan, if any apprehension should be felt for the security of his person, from the disturbed state of the capital.

No. 126.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 15, 1839, 10 P.M.

I INCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch which I have just received from Marshal Soult, announcing the death of the Sultan Mahmoud.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 136.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 10, 1839.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Metternich your Lordship's letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the 25th of June.

Before reading it, he remarked to me that the Note delivered by Admiral Roussin at Constantinople, and the instruction to Admiral Lalande, were both founded upon the false principle of an equality of right between the Sultan and the Pasha,—a principle which Austria could not adopt, and the falseness of which he had pointed out to M. de St. Aulaire.

After reading your Lordship's letter, Prince Metternich expressed his satisfaction with it in all its parts, and his sense of its completeness as an instruction. He has since dwelt much to me upon his astonishment that the French Government, with such an instruction before them, should have given one varying from it in essential points, incorrect in principle, and comparatively vague in its provisions.

I did not omit to point out to Prince Metternich the advantage of your Lordship's instruction over the Russian proposition, for confining hostilities within a certain district in case of their having commenced, in which, when he saw the application of the principle as laid down in your Lordship's letter, he fully concurred.

No. 37.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

IT appears certain that the Sultan died on the morning of the 29th, and that his death was kept secret for six-and-thirty hours, at the end of which period the only notification of it was the proclamation of his successor.

The orders to the Commanders, by sea and land, to suspend operations, were sent on the 28th or 29th. Admiral Roussin was ignorant, till some time afterwards, of this step having been taken, and he had received a refusal to his demand to be allowed to send an officer to the army of Hafiz Pasha. This refusal was founded upon various pretexts, and accompanied by a request to be furnished with the grounds of accommodation which he was authorized to propose between the Sultan and the Pasha. He was told that his first Note had not been laid before the Sultan, it being impossible to propose to his Highness to revert to the *statu quo*; but that if he would present a conciliatory reply, conveying a reasonable plan of arrangement, the clemency of the Sultan might probably be extended towards his vassal.

The leading Turkish Ministers have stated to Baron Stürmer, that if anything could have deterred them from ordering operations to be suspended, it would have been Admiral Roussin's tone in demanding it.

They further requested the Baron to apply to Prince Metternich for his advice how to act; and Hosrew Pasha stated, that if Mehemet Ali would restore Syria and Candia to the Porte, and would reduce his forces, the right of hereditary succession in Egypt might be secured to his family.

The documents, of which I have here given a summary, will be communicated to your Lordship, and to the French Government.

Prince Metternich's answer to Constantinople will approve of the suspension of hostilities; will recommend the Porte to keep its army and fleet entire, withdrawing them out of the reach of daily collisions; and will recommend them to await in total stillness the overtures of the

European Powers. To Mehemet Ali, the Prince will give the same advice, under pain of destruction, if he neglects it.

As to the plan of pacification, Prince Metternich fully adopts your Lordship's ideas; but the Porte having itself designated the terms upon which it is willing to confer Egypt upon the family of Mehemet Ali, he considers these, consisting of the restitution of Syria and Candia, and the disarming, as a *sine quâ non*; whereas the restitution of the eastern coast of the Red Sea, and the terms upon which Egypt is to be held as a fief, are open to negotiation.

His plan for the conduct of this negotiation is the following. It must begin at Constantinople, and will be complete when the Porte shall have agreed with the Five Powers upon the terms to be granted to the Pasha: this agreement to be consigned to official notes. When this is done, the Five Powers will notify to the Pasha the terms, and call upon him to accept them, supporting their intimation by such pressure, in case of refusal, as may be sufficient to determine his assent. This assent being obtained, the arrangement to be placed under the guarantee of the Five Powers. The outline of the terms is already sketched, and may be considered as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. France remains; and Prince Metternich requests the British Government to persuade France.

As to the eastern coast of the Red Sea, the amount of tribute, the obligation of treaties, present and future, entered into by the Porte, upon the Pasha, and the extent of reduction of force to be required of him; these, although of minor importance, are yet points which will offer many difficulties, and which must be regulated with the Porte, before an ultimatum can be presented to the Pasha. The only difficulty of treating them will be with France, and it will be for your Lordship to determine whether to treat them at Paris or here. I shall request Prince Metternich, in case your Lordship decides upon the former place, to direct Count Appony to give all the assistance in his power.

In the question of disarming, it is probable that the Porte will insist, as it is entitled to do, upon a diminution of Mehemet Ali's fleet, and this diminution is precisely what will be most unpleasant to France, who has always looked upon the naval power of Egypt as a reinforcement to her own, and thereby a counterpoise to our maritime superiority in the Mediterranean. If, therefore, this branch of the question is to be treated here, it will be necessary that I should be furnished with instructions as to the amount of reduction to be insisted upon, and the mode, specifying whether any part of the fleet is to be given up to the Sultan.

When this is settled, it will be necessary to establish the relations between the negotiation at Vienna and the Ambassadors at Constantinople.

It is clear that Vienna in its relations with that place is nearly a month a-head of London and Petersburg. It will therefore be for your Lordship to provide, that when the proposition to be presented to the Porte has been assented to by the Five Powers, it shall receive the support of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The application of the Porte to Prince Metternich for advice, and the proximity of this Capital, throw this branch of the negotiation very much into his hands; nor, considering the identity of his objects with our own, can it be better placed. The amount of this exclusive direction will be augmented or diminished in proportion to the number of references which shall be necessary to London and Paris.

When we come to treat with Egypt, the Maritime Powers must take the lead; and the first question will arise upon the mode of summoning the Pasha to accept the ultimatum of the Porte.

The modes are three,—by the Consuls, by the Admirals, or by a Commissioner to be sent on board the fleet. If the latter be preferred, how is the Commissioner to be chosen, and from whence is he to be sent? In either of the three alternatives, it will be necessary that the Admirals should be instructed how to act in case of Mehemet Ali's refusal to accept the Sultan's offer.

Three modes of notification

Prince Metternich believes that the moral weight of the Five Powers

acting in concert will determine the submission of the Pasha, but if it should not, I cannot but doubt the efficacy of a blockade to induce him to evacuate Syria. That country is reported to be provided with warlike stores for more than one campaign, nor would it be difficult to organize a transport by camels across the Desert. The Pasha's fleet would be laid up in port, and his commerce would pass under neutral flags. In such a case, the Russian proposition to consider ourselves in a state of war might be found the only one efficacious.

If any part of this second branch of the negotiation is to be treated from hence, (and I do not see, after an agreement has been come to at Constantinople, what can be gained by references to Paris and London,) it will be requisite that the Admirals should be furnished with instructions, and the negotiation here with directions for its guidance.

I have comprised in this despatch the result of many conversations with Prince Metternich, with the view of assisting the deliberations of Her Majesty's Government.

P. S.—I see I have omitted a consideration of much importance; it is, that whenever a common proposition shall have been agreed upon by the Five Powers, all separate communications either from the Ambassadors or from the Courts should cease.

If Mehemet Ali were to remark a difference of meaning, or even of tone, between any one of these and the collective language of the Alliance, the chance of his submission would be much diminished.

No. 138.

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has received answers from St. Petersburg, to his despatches of 14th June. They were copying for transmission to London and Paris, so that I did not see them; but the Prince assures me that they bespeak an identity of views with Austria. The despatches to which they reply, did no more than convey Prince Metternich's first communications to Constantinople. Prince Jablonowski, who left this on the 21st, bearing a private letter from Prince Metternich, recommending the establishment of a central point of negotiation, had but just reached Petersburg before their departure; a further courier, therefore, must be expected with the official answer to this proposition; but Russia already adopts the principle, that everything is to be done in common.

Upon all the details Prince Metternich agrees to your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adoption by Russia: so that, according to him, England, Austria, and Russia, are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 139.

Lord Beaurale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 11, 1839.

I THIS day applied to Prince Metternich upon the subject of the Austrian squadron. He told me it would consist of nine sail; that the Archduke had been ordered to hold himself in readiness to embark; but that its sailing would be delayed until an answer should be received from Paris to an application calling upon the French Government to conform its instruction to its Admiral to that which had been given by England;

the principle of parity between the Sultan and the Pasha being one which Austria could not admit, any more than she could its application to the equal treatment of their vessels. Till this was done, Prince Metternich said the Austrian squadron could not join the combined fleet, as it would not know with whom to act.

No. 140.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 12, 1839.

PRINCE METTERNICH has just communicated to me the whole of his despatches to Paris with their inclosures. They will be laid before your Lordship. His despatch upon the incorrectness of principle in the instructions to Admiral Lalande, is a masterpiece of argument. It treats the difference between the French and English Instructions as merely apparent, assuming and proving that the real thought of the French Cabinet cannot be other than that of England and Austria.

The despatch of Count Fiquelmont is conclusive upon this point, the Emperor regarding Mehemet Ali only as a rebellious subject.

No. 141.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord,

Vienna, July 14, 1839.

THE departure of Prince Metternich's courier was suspended, by the arrival of an estafette from Constantinople. I inclose Lord Ponsonby's despatches received by this occasion; those of the Internuncio will be communicated by Prince Esterhazy. There are two differences between them. The first is, that Baron Stürmer mentions it to be intended by the Porte to apprise Mehemet Ali that the Sultan may be induced to appoint one of his sons to the Pashalic of one of the Provinces he (Mehemet Ali) at present holds, which is virtually a relinquishment of Syria to Ibrahim Pasha. The other, that the Internuncio notifies the consent of the Representatives of the Five Powers having been given to support the propositions of the Porte, while Lord Ponsonby only speaks of their having agreed to notify the facts to the Consuls. There is a further difference between this overture made by Nouri Effendi, and the one he made to the Internuncio; in that, the evacuation of the Holy Cities was omitted, as in this, is the disarming.

Prince Metternich intends making no change in the attitude Austria has taken; on the contrary, the squadron will receive immediate orders to join the combined one of England and France, in the Levant. He holds that no difference of sentiment has taken place in the Turkish Councils; that the tranquillity now sought to be re-established would not last; and that the European Powers having been brought forwards, must carry through the task they have undertaken.

The reasoning upon which this opinion is founded will be laid before your Lordship, and appears to me to be founded in truth.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

BEAUVALE.

No. 142.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 1, 1839.

THE death of His Majesty the Sultan was not expected to take place so soon, for there had been alleviations of the malady, though not such as to give well-grounded hopes of his recovery. The event obliges the Internuncio to dispatch an estafette without delay, and I have no time to write as I wish to do upon so serious a subject as the state of this country; but I did write some time ago to Lord Beauvale, and I have now written a hasty letter to him, in which I have summarily given such opinions as I should lay before Her Majesty's Government in an official form if I had time; and perhaps Lord Beauvale will have the goodness to communicate them to your Lordship, if he thinks they ought to be submitted.

I regret that it is not competent to me to suggest any measures to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron, for I am of opinion that the presence of the squadron at the Dardanelles would be useful, and perhaps necessary to prevent the occurrence of things that may be disadvantageous to Her Majesty's interests in this country.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 143.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 2, 1839.

I RECEIVED, this evening, from his Excellency Nouri Effendi, a note, of which I inclose copy. The meeting probably will not be over in time to allow me afterwards to write by post, and therefore I will report now what I have good reason to believe is the substance of the business intended to be brought forward by the Ottoman Ministers,—namely, a communication of a resolution taken by the Sublime Porte, to propose to Mehemet Ali to make the Government of Egypt hereditary in his family on the terms of vassalage and tribute, provided he consents to restore Syria, and Candia, and Mecca, and Medina, to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.

Mon sieur l'Ambassadeur,

Constantinople, le 20 Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.

CHARGE d'ordre Souverain de faire à votre Excellence une communication importante, je m'empresse de la prévenir du désir que j'ai d'avoir l'honneur de m'entretenir avec elle, et de la prier par conséquent de vouloir bien se rendre à ma maison de campagne à Emirghienoghlu, demain à 5 heures à la Turque.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) NOURI.

(Translation.)

Nouri Effendi to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Constantinople, 20th Rebi-el-akhir, 1255.

CHARGED, by order of my Sovereign, to make to your Excellency an important communication, I hasten to acquaint you of my desire to have the honour of conversing with you, and consequently to request that you will have the goodness to come to my country-house at Emirghien-oghlu, to-morrow at 5 o'clock, Turkish time.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NOURI.

No. 144.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 3, 1839.

IN pursuance of the desire of the Sublime Porte, the Ministers of the Five Great Powers assembled this day at the House of the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nouri Effendi was the only Ottoman Minister present. He stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness' name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented, and his warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed between their Governments and the Ottoman Porte. This was handsomely expressed according to Turkish forms.

His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known to the Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan, being animated by the wish to put an end to the calamities which pressed heavily upon his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger he had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had determined to send one of the eminent men of his Court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence), and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family the hereditary government of Egypt to be held by the Pasha and his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c. should be immediately restored to the Sultan.

Nouri Effendi asked for the opinion of the Ministers, who replied that they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the prosperity of his Highness; that, being uninstructed by their Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments the communication they had received.

Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal intended to be made to the Pasha, and it was distinctly understood, that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country; that is, as I understand it, the limits that used to circumscribe the country as a Pashalic.

It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the negative. The Ministers thought it right to confine themselves to inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to them, and not to enter at all into discussion of the merits of the proposition.

Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their respective Governments; and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts and what had taken place to the Consuls,

I will forward by the French steamer, copy of my letter to Colonel Campbell.

There were questions asked as to the state of the armies in Syria, and Nouri Effendi said that orders had been sent, which would be received by Hafiz Pasha in about ten days, peremptorily commanding him not to engage in any act of hostility; and he added, that Mahomed Ali Bey had already carried orders to that officer to avoid attacking the Egyptian Army, and said the Porte had no intelligence of any fighting having taken place of greater magnitude than skirmishes between detached bodies of Irregulars, and so forth.

The Sultan's measure has the advantage of showing his disposition to live on friendly terms with the Pasha: he offers pardon and oblivion as to the past, and favour as to the future. He shows that the Pasha has not to fear from him the effects of personal hate, as he had from the deceased Mahmoud; and takes from the Pasha the excuse that fear afforded him for his armaments. He throws the defence upon the Pasha of continued rebellion, and of the disturbance of the peace of the world, which will be the consequence of his pursuit of projects of aggrandizement and ambition.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 145.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1839.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a draft of Note which Baron Roussin has been instructed to present to the Turkish Government, requesting that if the naval or military forces of other Powers are invited to Constantinople, the French Squadron may be permitted to pass the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 146.

Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney, July 18.)

Juillet, 1839.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de France, a reçu l'ordre de faire la communication suivante à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte.

Les graves événemens qui viennent d'éclater en Syrie, imposent à la politique des Cours Européennes l'obligation de prévoir jusqu'aux chances les plus invraisemblables de la crise qu'ils ont fait naître.

Il est sans doute bien peu probable qu'on voie renaître aujourd'hui les dangers qui en 1833 menaçaient la capitale même de l'Empire Ottoman, et forçaient la Porte à accepter un appui étranger. Sans parler des autres circonstances qui, depuis lors, se sont tant modifiées, il y a tout lieu d'espérer que les efforts des Grandes Puissances Européennes pour arrêter les hostilités à peine commencées, préviendront des extrémités semblables.

Encore une fois, pourtant, il faut tout prévoir, et l'histoire présente trop d'exemples d'accidens inattendus qui ont trompé les calculs des Gouvernemens les plus forts et les plus habiles, pour que la Sublime Porte puisse considérer comme une injure, l'hypothèse d'un désastre qui l'obligerait de nouveau à réclamer, pour sa défense, l'appui de ses Alliés.

Le jour où l'existence du trône du Sultan serait réellement compromise, elle les trouverait tous disposés à lui accorder leur concours pour prévenir une catastrophe qui, en ébranlant l'équilibre politique, mettrait en péril

la paix du monde, dont le maintien les intéresse tous au même degré. A Pétersbourg, à Vienne, à Berlin, à Londres, à Paris, il n'y a qu'un sentiment à cet égard.

Dans un tel état de choses, la Sublime Porte comprendrait sans doute que le moyen le plus assuré de concilier avec la nécessité fâcheuse où elle se trouverait réduite, le soin de sa dignité et même de sa sûreté, ce serait de demander, non pas à une Puissance en particulier, mais à l'Europe entière, l'appui qui lui serait devenu indispensable. Un grand Empire ne déchoit pas, en effet, en se plaçant sous la protection des grands intérêts Européens. Il trouve dans la diversité même de ces intérêts, lorsqu'ils se réunissent pour venir à son aide, la garantie certaine que cette protection ne pourra pas se transformer en une suprématie dangereuse pour son indépendance.

Le système de conduite que cette considération puissante indique à la Sublime Porte est d'ailleurs le seul qui s'accorde avec les convenances et les justes susceptibilités de la politique des Grandes Cours, dont il lui importe certainement de tenir compte.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a donc la conviction qu'il va au-devant des intentions de la Sublime Porte en demandant que, dans le cas où les forces de terre ou de mer d'une ou de plusieurs des Cours Alliées seraient appelées à Constantinople, les ordres fussent donnés pour ouvrir immédiatement le passage des Dardanelles à une escadre Française qui viendrait, de son côté, protéger le trône du Sultan contre les périls dont l'imminence aurait déterminé une telle mesure.

Le Soussigné prie Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de lui faire parvenir le plus promptement possible, la réponse de la Sublime Porte à cette communication, pour qu'il puisse, ainsi qu'il en a l'ordre, l'envoyer sur le champ à Paris.

(Signé)

BARON ROUSSIN.

(Translation.)

Draft of Note to be presented to the Porte by Admiral Roussin.

July, 1839.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador of France, has received orders to make the following communication to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte.

The serious events which have just occurred in Syria, render it obligatory upon the policy of the Courts of Europe to anticipate even the most improbable chances of the crisis which those events have produced.

It is indeed very little likely, that a recurrence should be witnessed at the present time of those perils, which, in 1833, menaced even the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and forced the Porte to accept foreign support. Without mentioning the other circumstances which since that time have been so much modified, there is every reason to hope, that the efforts of the Great European Powers to put a stop to hostilities which have scarcely commenced, will prevent the like extremities.

Once again, however, it is necessary to anticipate everything, and history offers too many instances of unlooked-for accidents which have deceived the calculations of the strongest and most skilful Governments, for the Sublime Porte to regard as an insult the supposition of a disaster which might compel it again to solicit for its defence the support of its Allies.

The day that the existence of the Sultan's throne should really be compromised, the Porte would find them all inclined to afford it their co-operation to prevent a catastrophe which, by shaking the political balance, would endanger the peace of the world, in the maintenance of which they are all interested to the same degree. At Petersburg, at Vienna, at Berlin, at London, and at Paris, there is but one opinion in this respect.

In such a state of things, the Sublime Porte would doubtless understand that the surest method of reconciling a regard for its dignity, and even for its security, with the grievous necessity to which it would find

itself reduced, would be, to request, not from one Power in particular, but from the whole of Europe, the support which would be indispensable for it. A great Empire, in fact, is not degraded by placing itself under the protection of the great European interests. It finds even in the diversity of those interests, when they unite in coming to its succour, the sure guarantee that this protection cannot be transformed into a supremacy dangerous to its independence.

The system of conduct which this weighty consideration indicates to the Sublime Porte is, moreover, the only one which is consistent with the duties and the just susceptibilities of the policy of the Great Courts, which it is certainly important for the Porte to pay attention to.

His Majesty's Government therefore is persuaded, that it meets the intentions of the Sublime Porte by requesting that, in the event of the land or sea forces of one or more of the Allied Courts being invited to Constantinople, orders may be given immediately to open the passage of the Dardanelles to a French squadron, which, on its part, would arrive for the protection of the throne of the Sultan against the perils, the imminence of which would have led to such a measure being determined upon.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs to forward to him as quickly as possible the answer of the Sublime Porte to this communication, in order that he may immediately send it, as he is instructed to do, to Paris.

(Signed) **BARON ROUSSIN.**

No. 147.

Earl Granville & Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)

My Lord,

Paris, July 22, 1839.

THE inclosed telegraphic despatches, one from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, and the other from the French Consul-General at Alexandria, were sent to me this day by Marshal Soult. The intelligence they contain, though coming from opposite quarters, is in substance the same; and no doubt, therefore, can be entertained of the complete rout of the Turkish army under Hafiz Pasha.

I was not at home this morning when Count Appony called upon me, but I have just been told by Marshal Soult, that the Austrian Ambassador has received despatches from Prince Metternich, containing accounts from Constantinople of the 3rd, stating that an entire change in the politics of the Divan had taken place.

The Internuncio writes, that Nouri Effendi had communicated to him, and also to the other Ambassadors of the Great European Powers, that the Sultan had determined to accord to Mehemet Ali the hereditary right to the government of Egypt; and that he proposed sending an Envoy of rank and consideration to Alexandria, charged to communicate to the Pasha this determination, and to deliver to him the decoration of the highest order in the Turkish Empire, with magnificent presents. The Marshal Soult was inclined to think that the news of the battle of the 24th of June, though not divulged, must have reached Constantinople on the 3rd, and that the intelligence of this disaster caused the sudden veering in the politics of the Turkish Government; but in Admiral Roussin's despatch of the 8th, from Therapia, it is stated, that the Porte had only just received the news of the battle. It is not improbable that the partizans of Mehemet Ali at Constantinople, relieved from the terror inspired by the Sultan Mahmoud, may have gained an ascendancy in the councils of the new sovereign. It seems, however, that Prince Metternich had instructed the Internuncio to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from thus prostrating himself before Mehemet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European Powers for protection.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **GRANVILLE.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 147.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles, of the 22nd July, at 5 A. M.

Le Consul-Général à M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

Alexandrie, le 6.

L'ARMEE Egyptienne sous les ordres d'Ibrahim Pacha ayant attaqué l'armée Turque commandée par le Séraskier Hafiz Pacha, à Nézib, au-delà d'Alep, celle-ci a abandonné le champ de bataille après un combat de deux heures. Tout le matériel, en fusils, canons, et munitions, est tombé au pouvoir des Egyptiens. Ibrahim a écrit cette nouvelle le 25 Juin, sous la tente du Général-en-Chef Turc. Il était de retour à Antab le 28, mais avait donné ordre à trois régimens d'infanterie et trois régimens de cavalerie de se porter en avant sur Ourfa et Diarbékir.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 5 A.M.

The Consul-General to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Alexandria, the 6th.

THE Egyptian Army under the orders of Ibrahim Pasha, having attacked the Turkish Army commanded by the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, at Nezib, beyond Aleppo, the latter abandoned the field of battle after an action of two hours. All the *matériel*, in guns, cannon, and ammunition, has fallen into the power of the Egyptians. Ibrahim wrote this intelligence the 25th of June, from the tent of the Turkish General-in-Chief. He had returned to Aintab on the 28th, but had ordered three regiments of Infantry and three regiments of Cavalry, to advance upon Orfa and Diarbekir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 147.

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 P.M.

Thérapia, le 8.

LA Porte vient de recevoir la nouvelle qu'une bataille a été livrée dans le voisinage d'Alep, le 24 Juin, et que l'Armée Turque a été détruite. Les débris ont repassé la frontière, et on ne dit pas que l'Armée Egyptienne les ait poursuivis.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles of the 22nd July, at 3 P.M.

Therapia, the 8th.

THE Porte has just received the intelligence that a battle has been fought in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, on the 24th of June, and that the Turkish Army has been destroyed. The remains have repassed the frontier, and it is not said that the Egyptian Army has pursued them.

Inclosure 1 in No. 156.

*Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.**L'Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.**Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir.*

LE 10, arrivée à Alexandrie de Akiff Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Méhémet Ali la mort de son père; le confirmer dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, avec l'hérédité dans sa famille; et lui proposer l'oubli du passé, en le nommant Généralissime et soutien de l'Empire Turc; et en l'invitant à se rendre à Constantinople pour présider à la réorganisation de l'administration.

L'escadre Anglaise croise dans les parages de Chypre, et communique avec Alexandrie.

La "Gazette d'Agra" du 9 Mai, annonce que Runjeet Singh était dans un état désespéré.

Ces nouvelles ont été apportées à Malte par le paquebot Anglais "l'Acheron," parti d'Alexandrie le 14, et M. Fabreguette a profité du bateau à vapeur Anglais le "Blazer," qui arrive à l'instant, pour me les transmettre avec une dépêche pour vous, que je vous enverrai par le courrier de demain matin.

(Translation.)

*Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.**The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.**Marseilles, July 25, 3 P.M.*

AKIFF EFFENDI arrived at Alexandria on the 10th, sent by the young Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father, to confirm him in the Government of Egypt and of Syria, with hereditary succession in his family; and to propose to him to forget the past, nominating him Generalissimo and support of the Turkish Empire, and inviting him to proceed to Constantinople to preside over the reorganization of the administration.

The English squadron is cruising off Cyprus, and communicates with Alexandria.

The "Gazette d'Agra" of the 9th of May, announces that Runjeet Sing was in a hopeless state.

These news have been brought to Malta by the English Packet, "the Acheron," which left Alexandria the 14th, and M. Fabreguette has taken advantage of the English steam-boat the "Blazer", just arrived, to transmit them to me, with a despatch for you, which I will send you by the Courier of to morrow morning.

Inclosure 2 in No. 156.

*Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles.**L'Agent des Affaires Etrangères à M. le Président du Conseil.**Marseille, 25 Juillet, 3 h. du soir.*

LE 8, on connaissait à Alexandrie la mort du Sultan. Le 9, arrivée à Alexandrie d'une Corvette Turque ayant à bord Negib Bey, Kiaja du Capitan Pacha, chargé d'annoncer au Vice-Roi la présence du Capitan Pacha à Stankio, se dirigeant sur Rhodes, et de lui proposer de placer la flotte Turque sous sa protection, pour la garantir contre les troubles à craindre par suite de la mort du Sultan. On ignore la réponse de

Méhémet Ali, qui a expédié le bateau à vapeur la "Mer Noire" au Capitan Pacha.

Le 10, arrivée à Alexandrie d'Akiff Effendi, envoyé par le jeune Sultan pour annoncer à Méhémet Ali la mort de son père.

(Translation.)

Telegraphic Despatch from Marseilles,

The Agent of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council.

Marseilles, July 25, 3 P.M.

THE death of the Sultan was known at Alexandria on the 8th. On the 9th a Turkish Corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Negib Bey, Kiaja of the Capudan Pasha, having orders to inform the Viceroy, that the Capudan Pasha was at Stankio, on his way to Rhodes, and to propose to him to place the Turkish Fleet under his protection, to secure it against the troubles which it is feared may follow the death of the Sultan. The reply of Mehemet Ali, who has sent the steam-boat, the "Mer Noire," to the Capudan Pasha, is not known.

On the 10th, Akiff Effendi arrived at Alexandria, sent by the young Sultan to announce to Mehemet Ali the death of his father.

No. 157.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1839.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 26th instant, reporting your conversation with Marshal Soult, as to the course which should be followed by the Five Powers in the present state of the affairs of the Levant.

Your Excellency will express to Marshal Soult, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt, that the sentiments of the Government of France upon these important matters coincide so exactly and entirely with their own; and your Excellency will assure Marshal Soult, that Her Majesty's Government fully agree with him in thinking, that neither the overthrow of the Turkish Army, nor the treachery of the Capudan Pasha, nor the timidity or submission of the Divan, ought to alter, in any degree, the course which the Five Powers had previously intended to pursue; and that any arrangements which may have been made between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, at a moment when the advisers of the Sultan were struck down with fear, or influenced by treacherous motives, ought to be regarded as null; and that a declaration to this effect should be made to Mehemet Ali. Her Majesty's Government will immediately instruct Lord Beauvale to make to the Austrian Government a communication upon this subject, similar to that which the French Government has instructed M. de St. Aulaire to make.

Her Majesty's Government sincerely rejoice at the complete identity of opinion on these most important matters between France and England; and they consider this identity as being the more valuable, because it has arisen spontaneously, each Government having been led to the same conclusion by its own view of the great European interests which are involved in these questions.

There can be no doubt, that this perfect union of England and France will confirm Austria in the course which she was herself one of the first to chalk out. With Austria, Prussia will go; and it is impossible that Russia can be unwilling to concur in the same course.

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha.—July 5, 1839.

IT is already some days since I wrote to your Excellency to announce to you the accession to the Imperial Throne of the most majestic, most magnificent, and most powerful Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, our Lord and Master, in consequence of the death of him whom it has pleased Providence to call to a better life.

His Highness, endowed with uprightness and with wisdom, qualities with which Heaven has favoured him, said as soon as he ascended the throne:

"The Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali Pasha, having been guilty of certain offensive proceedings against my late glorious father, many things up to the present time have taken place; and latterly also, he has made preparations. But I do not wish that the tranquillity of my subjects should be disturbed, and that Mussulman blood should be spilt. I forget, then, the past; and provided that Mehemet Ali Pasha shall exactly fulfil the duties of submission and of vassalage, I grant him my Sovereign pardon, I design for him a magnificent decoration, and similar to that of my other illustrious Viziers, and I grant the hereditary succession of his sons to the Government of Egypt."

Such are the gracious words which His Highness has spoken; and as I have been appointed Grand Vizier, an honour which I do not deserve, and as your Excellency is one of my old acquaintances, the wish which His Highness has just expressed cannot fail, considering the sincere friendship which I entertain for you, to cause me a lively satisfaction.

Orders have been forthwith sent to the Seraskier of the East, his Excellency Hafiz Pasha, to halt his army; and the Imperial fleet, which was on the point of sailing from the Dardanelles, has been detained. According to the orders of His Highness, the decoration which is intended for you is being prepared, and the firman of your investiture, and we will send them to you hereafter.

In the meanwhile the most distinguished Akiff Effendi, Secretary to the Council of the Porte, is sent to your Excellency to announce to you this joyful news, and to inform you in detail of the sentiments which His Highness has been pleased to express as regards you.

We trust in God that, under the auspices of the most magnificent reigning Sultan, our Lord and Master, who is established by Heaven, the people of all parts of the Empire will enjoy the greatest tranquillity. But it is evident, that the realization of this hope depends on the union among the Mussulmans. On this account it is necessary, according to the prudence and wisdom which characterise you, and agreeably to the orders of His Highness, that the past be buried in oblivion, and that your Excellency withdraw your armies and give heed to maintain this union; and it is in this hope that I have addressed you this despatch.

No. 177.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

My Lord,

Therapia, July 10, 1839.

I HAVE heard no more news respecting the Army of Hafiz Pasha, and nothing of the movements of Ibrahim Pasha.

There are no news yet come from the Ottoman fleet, but I hear the Sublime Porte has sent a Hatti Scheriff by some agent to be read to the officers and crews of the vessels, ordering them to return to Constantinople.

Public tranquillity continues undisturbed.

The messenger who was the bearer of your Lordship's despatches to the 17th of June, arrived late last night, and will be kept here till I can state, with some precision, the state of affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 178.

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Hertford House, le 1er Août, 1839.

PAR sa dépêche d'avant-hier, le Maréchal Soult me charge de vous donner lecture de la lettre qu'il adresse à notre Consul-Général à Alexandrie, sous la date du 27 Juillet. Pour ne pas vous importuner, je vous en envoie copie, et je le fais avec d'autant plus d'empressement, que vous trouverez la pensée de ces instructions parfaitement conforme à la déclaration du Maréchal à Lord Granville.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) BOURQUENEY.

(Translation.)

Baron de Bourqueney to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord,

Hertford House, August 1, 1839.

MARSHAL SOULT, by his despatch of the day before yesterday, instructs me to read to you the letter which he has addressed to our Consul-General at Alexandria, dated the 27th of July. In order not to importune you, I send you a copy of this letter, and I do this with the more satisfaction, since you will find the spirit of these instructions in perfect conformity with the declaration of the Marshal to Lord Granville.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) BOURQUENEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 178.

Marshal Soult to the Consul-General of France at Alexandria.—(Communicated by Baron de Bourqueney.)

Monsieur,

Paris, le 27 Juillet, 1839.

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 115 inclusivement. Celles de M. de Lurde me sont également parvenues.

Le Gouvernement du Roi voit avec peine, que les avantages obtenus par Méhémet Ali, loin de lui inspirer la modération qui conviendrait si bien à la position forte et glorieuse dans laquelle il se trouve placé, semblent avoir éveillé dans son esprit et des espérances et des projets dont rien dans ces derniers tems n'avait indiqué l'existence.

Le langage qu'il a tenu à M. de Lurde est certainement en accord avec l'intention si récemment exprimée par lui dans les instructions envoyées à Ibrahim Pacha, de s'en remettre pour la conclusion de sa querelle avec la Porte, aux négociations qu'allaient entamer les Puissances Européennes. Ces instructions par cela même qu'elles nous avaient été officiellement communiquées, et qu'un de mes officiers d'ordonnance en avait été rendu porteur, constituent à notre égard un engagement qui n'a pu être rompu par des faits auxquels nous sommes complètement étrangers.

Le Gouvernement du Roi veut croire que le Vice-Roi, promptement remis de l'exaltation qu'ont pu lui causer des succès aussi rapides que

No. 189.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 5, 1839.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, copies of two letters which I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing instructions for the guidance of the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean, in the present state of the affairs in the Levant.

These instructions have been prepared by me, in concert with M. de Bourqueney; but M. de Bourqueney could not take upon himself the responsibility of agreeing to them on behalf of his Government. He sent copies of them, however, to Paris on Saturday evening, for the consideration of his Government; and I have settled with him that these instructions should be sent immediately to your Excellency, in order that you may send on the messenger and the instructions, if the French Government should agree to what is proposed; by which means several days may be gained in the arrival of the instructions.

If the French Government should object to any part, and should wish for alterations, then the messenger will wait at Paris till the two Governments shall have come to an understanding.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 190.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir George Hamilton.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 6, 1839.

I HAVE received your despatch of July 24, reporting the substance of your conversations with Baron Werther, upon the present state of affairs in the Levant; and I have to instruct you to express to that Minister the sincere gratification which is felt by Her Majesty's Government in finding that the views and opinions of the Cabinets of London and of Berlin upon the Affairs of the Levant are so entirely the same; and that the course of policy which it appears in the present crisis to be so important for the Five Powers to pursue, will be supported by the weight and authority of Prussia. Baron Werther will, no doubt, have already been informed that the French Government is of opinion that the defeat of the Turkish Army, the defection of the fleet, and the timidity of the Divan, ought to make no alteration in the course which the Five Powers had intended to pursue before those events were known; and you will state to Baron Werther, that in that opinion Her Majesty's Government entirely concur.

Those unfortunate events cannot in any degree diminish the great interest which Europe has in maintaining the Ottoman Empire in its integrity and independence as an essential element of the balance of power; nor can those events diminish in any sensible degree the means which the Five Powers, if united, must necessarily have, of carrying into effect any arrangement which they may unanimously agree upon as necessary for the accomplishment of the great objects which they have in view. But those events, by rendering more apparent the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire would be exposed, if left to itself, and by showing more clearly the imminence of those dangers, afford additional proofs of the necessity of union, vigour and promptness on the part of the Five Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 191.

Colonel Campbell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, July 17, 1839.

INCLOSED I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of two despatches received by me from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, together with copy of my reply thereto, and which has been sent this day to Constantinople by the same steamer which brought Viscount Ponsonby's despatch.

I have endeavoured to be as explanatory as possible in my despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador, and which consequently obviates the necessity of any further observations on my part to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

PATRICK CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 191.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Campbell.

Sir,

Therapia, July 5, 1839.

ON the 3rd instant, the Representatives of the Five Great Powers were invited to meet the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his house on the Bosphorus. When they were assembled, his Excellency Nouri Effendi stated, that the Sultan had commanded him to assure the Ministers, in his Highness's name, of his esteem and friendship for the Sovereigns they represented, and his warm desire to cultivate by every means the good understanding that existed between the Ottoman Porte and their Governments.

His Excellency proceeded to say, he was commanded to make known to the Ministers of his Allies and friends, that the Sultan being animated by the wish to put an end to the calamities which press heavily upon his people, in consequence of the conduct of the Pasha of Egypt, and the anger it had excited in the bosom of the late Sultan Mahmoud, had determined to send one of the eminent men of his Court to offer the Egyptian Pasha pardon for the past, and assurance of favour for the future (of which the Sultan sent a decoration as the mark and evidence), and to promise that his Highness would confer upon the Pasha and his family the hereditary Government of Egypt, to be held by the Pasha and his descendants as vassals, on the condition that Syria, &c., &c., should be immediately restored to the Sultan.

Nouri Effendi asked the opinion of the Representatives, who replied, that they would rejoice in the restoration of peace, and were warmly desirous of the prosperity of his Highness; that being uninstructed by their Governments, they could not give any opinion as to the terms which the Sublime Porte was about to propose to the Pasha, but they would not fail to report to their Governments the communication they had received.

Questions were asked to ascertain precisely the nature of the proposal intended to be made to the Pasha; and it was distinctly understood, that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary Government of Egypt, within the boundaries that were formerly the limits of that country; that is, as I understand it, the limit that used to circumscribe the country as a Pashalic.

It was asked if it was intended to leave Mehemet Ali in possession of Syria, or of Mecca, or Medina, or of St. John d'Acre, and the reply was in the negative. The Representatives thought it right to confine themselves to inquiries directed solely to the perfect elucidation of what was stated to them, and not to enter at all into the discussion of the merits of the proposition.

Nouri Effendi desired the Ministers to write to the Consuls of their respective Governments, and the Ministers agreed to notify the facts, and what had taken place, to the Consuls.

Ainsi se termina notre première conversation avec Méhémet Ali.

Notre seconde réunion, fixée d'abord au lendemain matin, fut remise ensuite à l'après-midi, à cause du débarquement d'Achmet Pacha, qui fut reçu le même jour par le Vice-Roi. Deux heures avant le coucher du soleil, les quatre Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, de France, et de Russie, se rendirent simultanément chez le Pacha. Dans cet entretien, des tentatives furent renouvelées pour engager Méhémet Ali à se désister dès à présent de la flotte, et à la rendre à son légitime propriétaire; mais cette fois encore nos représentations furent en pure perte.

Il protesta de ses intentions conservatrices; récapitula de nouveau la déclaration qu'il nous avait faite la veille; y apporta quelque modification dans les expressions, et s'efforça surtout à nous convaincre de la nécessité de la chute de Hosreff Pacha.

Il disait à ce sujet:—"Aussi longtemps que le Grand Vizir restera en place, il n'y aura pas de véritable accommodement entre le Sultan et moi. Que Sa Hautesse nomme Grand Vizir qui elle voudra, et je serai le premier à coopérer à la consolidation de son trône. Je ne brigue point pour moi ce poste, car je le refuserai si on me l'offrait, mais je désire ardemment l'éloignement d'un homme qui est détesté par la nation entière, et auquel tous les moyens sont bons pour arriver à son but, même le fer et le poison. Tant que les Représentans des Quatre Grands Cabinets soutiendront Hosreff Pacha, il pourra rester en place, mais le jour où il ne jouira plus de leur protection, il tombera. Aujourd'hui, si la tranquillité n'est point menacée à Constantinople, c'est grâce à l'appui des Grandes Puissances; que Hosreff se retire, et la tranquillité se maintiendra dans la capitale sans leur coopération. Je viens d'écrire au Grand Vizir une lettre particulière, par laquelle je lui donne le conseil de quitter les affaires et de demander sa démission. Cette lettre sera remise à Akiff Effendi, que j'expédie demain pour Constantinople. Par le prochain bateau à vapeur Français j'écirai dans le même sens à la sœur du Sultan Mahmoud, et la Valide Sultane, car en leur envoyant mes lettres par Akiff Effendi, Hosreff Pacha serait honnête à les soustraire."

Avant de quitter le Vice-Roi, il nous engagea de profiter du départ pyroscaphe Ottoman pour Constantinople, afin de transmettre nos Rapports à nos Ministres respectifs.

(Translation.)

Brief Summary of two Interviews which took place between the Pasha of Egypt, and the Consuls-General of the Four Great Courts.

ON the 14th of July, towards 5 o'clock in the evening, the Turkish fleet, with the Capudan Pasha on board, appeared in sight of Alexandria. Upon this being known, the Consuls-General of Austria, England, and Russia repaired to the Viceroy, in order to exhort him not to allow himself to adopt any inconsiderate measure, and to obtain from His Highness some tranquillizing promises with respect to his future conduct. The Consul-General of France, being kept at home by indisposition, had requested his Colleagues to speak in his name. This meeting, moreover, was only to be a prelude to the general meeting fixed for the ensuing day.

We began by representing to the Viceroy how groundless were the accusations which, with the view of giving a colour to and justifying his defection, Achmet Pasha had brought against Hosrew and Halil Pasha, particularly the reports spread abroad respecting the poisoning of Sultan Mahmoud, so little in conformity with the depositions of the European doctors who had attended His Highness during the course of his illness.

Passing then to the present position of affairs, we told him that the Representatives of the Great Powers, with the view of avoiding armed intervention to the last moment, and desiring the peaceable solution of the Eastern Question, seriously entreated him to come to an amicable arrangement with the Sultan; that His Highness had already given him a striking proof of his magnanimity by granting him the hereditary

Government of Egypt; that it was now the Pasha's turn to give a proof of goodwill and submission towards his Sovereign, and to accelerate the peaceful solution of this struggle. That for this purpose the immediate restitution of the fleet would be the most evident pledge of his good faith.

Mehemet Ali replied to us: "I do not pretend to exculpate Achmet Pasha; his assertion may indeed not be well founded; and I dare say that all that he has written to me ought rather to be attributed to the hatred with which Hosrew Pasha inspires him. As to the concession made by the Sultan, I do not consider it as a mark of generosity on his part, but as an act of necessity. As long as Hosrew Pasha shall be at the head of affairs I must mistrust all his assertions, and I cannot reckon upon a sincere reconciliation. I must therefore aim at something positive, and not content myself with promises and oaths. How could I put faith in Hosrew who is my mortal foe?

We represented to His Highness, that he was too experienced in business to allow himself to be duped; that the written promises of the Sultan sheltered him from the artifices of the Grand Vizier; that it was his interest not to excite disorders at Constantinople, which might easily spring up upon the news of the loss of the Turkish Army, of the defection of the fleet, and of the uncertainty which was felt respecting the attitude of the Viceroy. That the best method of re-establishing the security of the capital would be to restore the fleet to His Highness, to send to Constantinople without delay some person, charged to make in his name his submission to the Grand Signor, and to lay before him the wishes of His Highness. That Achmet Pasha, having quitted the Dardanelles, after having received the order to proceed with the fleet to Constantinople, had committed an act of high treason; and that the Representatives of the Great Courts felt repugnance to believe that he was willing to make himself an accomplice of the Capudan Pasha by accepting the fleet at his hands.

Here the Pasha loudly protested against such an argument, alleging that, in time of war, it was permitted to receive deserters. We replied to him, that the defection of Achmet Pasha had taken place after the sending of the Grand Vizier's letter, which announced, in the name of the Sultan Abdul Medjid, the oblivion of the past, the forwarding of the firman, and the grant of the inheritance of Egypt; that, moreover, the Viceroy had himself looked upon peace as re-established, since he had given orders to his son Ibrahim Pasha, upon the receipt of the Grand Vizier's letter, to retire with his troops on this side of the Euphrates.

"Yes," answered Mehemet Ali, "I am no longer in hostility with the Sultan, who, as I have already told you, is innocent and pure as a diamond; but I am at war with his Ministers, who have not been named by the voice of the nation, and who by means of intrigues have usurped the chief posts of the country, and now pretend to dictate the law."

To this reasoning of the Pasha, we replied, that according to the knowledge which we possessed of persons at Constantinople, Hosrew Pasha appeared to us to be the only man capable of directing affairs at such a critical moment as a change of reign in Turkey always was; that the wishes of the nation went for nothing in this; that it had never been consulted, and that therefore it was difficult to know its opinion; that above all things it was important to overawe the people at a critical moment; and that the history of the Ottoman Empire in general, afforded us an example, that the accession of a Sultan to the throne had never taken place without a shock, without shedding of blood, and without a change of Ministry.

The conversation turned for some time longer upon the character and the capacity of the different great dignitaries of Turkey, and upon the changes which, according to the Pasha, would be favourable to the consolidation of the present Government. Then having taken a few turns up and down the room, the Viceroy proceeded:—"It is not my intention for the present to send an officer to Constantinople to compliment the Sultan on his accession to the throne, but I beg you to transmit

to the Representatives of the Four Great Powers at the Ottoman Porte, the following declaration, namely:—

"That in two days Akiff Effendi will set out again for Constantinople. He will be the bearer of a letter of congratulation and of submission from me, to the new Sultan Abdul Medjid. I shall also write a letter to Hosrew Pasha, in which I shall represent to him:—1st. That the late Sultan Mahmoud made to me at one time, through the medium of Sarim Effendi, much more advantageous proposals than those which His Highness has now addressed to me, since he then proposed to me the hereditary Government of Egypt, as well as that of the district of Seyda, and of the Sandjack of Tripoli. 2ndly. That, under present circumstances, I ask for the hereditary Government of Egypt, with that of Syria and of Candia, that is to say, of all that I now possess, as I had previously announced. 3rdly. That on this condition, if I am treated with good faith, I will be the most faithful of the servants and vassals of His Highness, and I will defend him whenever and against whomsoever he may wish.

"It is in this sense that I propose to write to Constantinople. I shall not mention the fleet in my letter to the Grand Vizier, from a feeling of propriety, but I beg you to have the goodness to assure the Ambassadors and Ministers, that I have never had the intention of keeping it, or of making use of it for a hostile purpose against the Sultan; on the contrary, I formally engage to restore it, the moment my proposals shall have been accepted. In this case, all the vessels composing the squadron of His Highness, to the very last, shall be sent back to Constantinople. As for the Ottoman Admirals, those who may fear to return to Turkey, may remain in Egypt, which forms a part of the same monarchy. If once the Sultan agrees to my prayer, and Hosrew Pasha shall have been removed from the direction of affairs, I shall not hesitate to proceed to Constantinople on the first invitation of His Highness, and it will not be with the squadron that I shall go thither, but alone in a steamer, and with the sole object of presenting my homage in person to my Sovereign and offering him my services.

"Finally I declare to you, that if my proposals are not accepted, I will not make war, but I will maintain myself in my present position, and I will wait."

Thus ended our first conversation with Mehemet Ali.

Our second meeting, fixed in the first instance for the ensuing morning, was afterwards put off to the afternoon, on account of the landing of Achmet Pasha, who was received the same day by the Viceroy. Two hours before sunset, the Four Consuls-General of Austria, England, France, and Russia, proceeded simultaneously to the Pasha. In this interview renewed endeavours were made to induce Mehemet Ali to give up the fleet forthwith, and to restore it to its lawful owner; but here, again, our representations were entirely thrown away.

He declared his conservative intentions; recapitulated afresh the declaration which he had made to us the evening before; modified in some degree the expressions contained in it, and endeavoured above all to convince us of the necessity for the fall of Hosrew Pasha.

On this subject he said, "As long as the Grand Vizier remains in office, there will be no real reconciliation between the Sultan and me. Let His Highness name whom he will Grand Vizier, and I will be the first to co-operate for the consolidation of his throne. I do not aspire to that post myself, for I should refuse it if it were offered to me; but I ardently wish for the removal of a man who is detested by the whole nation, and who avails himself of any means, even the sword and poison, to attain his end. So long as the Representatives of the Four Great Cabinets support Hosrew Pasha, he may remain in office, but the day that he ceases to enjoy their protection he will fall. If, at this moment, tranquillity is not threatened at Constantinople, it is owing to the support of the Great Powers. Let Hosrew retire, and tranquillity will be preserved in the capital without their co-operation. I have just written a private letter to the Grand Vizier, in which I advise him to retire from affairs, and to ten-

der his resignation. This letter will be given to Akiff Effendi, whom I despatch to Constantinople to-morrow. By the next French steamer I shall write to the same effect to the sister of Sultan Mahmoud, and the Validé Sultana; for, if I send them my letters by Akiff Effendi, Hosrew Pasha is capable of withholding them.

Before leaving the Viceroy, he requested us to take advantage of the departure of the Turkish steamer for Constantinople, to send our reports to our respective Ministers.

Inclosure 6 in No. 191.

Detail of First Interview of the Capudan Pasha with Mehemet Ali.

(Translation.)

ON the 14th of July, at 4 o'clock P.M., appeared the Sultan's fleet off Alexandria, in number of nineteen sail.

On the 15th, at 9 o'clock A.M., the Egyptian steamer the "Nile" entered the western harbour, having on board Mushir Achmet Pasha, the Admiral of the said fleet. Immediately, Mehemet Ali's first Secretary, named Houssein Pasha, was sent from the palace in the Pasha's own boat, to meet and bring him on shore. When the "Nile" steamer anchored, Mushir Achmet went into the boat, and immediately a salute of nineteen guns was fired by the "Nile," which salute was repeated by the forts the moment he landed, when he was received by the Pasha's civil officers of rank, and he rode upon the Pasha's own horse; and thus preceded by the said officers, cawasses, and chiaushes, went to the Pasha's palace between two files of the troops that were placed all the way. As soon as he entered the palace gate, Mehemet Ali walked out of his room to meet him, when the Admiral seeing him, unbuckled his sword, gave it to one of the officers behind him, and walked respectfully towards the Viceroy, and bowed to the ground as if meaning to kiss his dress, while the Viceroy embraced and kissed him, saying "Welcome, brother." After this, they walked arm in arm into the Viceroy's room, all the officers following them. They sat near each other on the middle of the sofa. The Capudan Pasha then told his Highness that, for a long time past, it was his wish to have the honour of seeing him. After coffee and pipes, the Viceroy dismissed all the bystanders, and this was at half-past 9 o'clock; when Sherif Aga, the Capudan's Pasha's Kiaja, who was still within, walked up to the Viceroy, and, kissing his feet, told him, "Now you are both together, with your leave I retire," meaning that he had accomplished his object, and fulfilled his duty so far. His Highness and the Capudan Pasha remained by themselves in the room till half-past 10 o'clock, after which the Capudan Pasha walked out of the room bare-footed, his own servant not being there to give him his shoes, and was obliged to walk about twenty paces without shoes, until his servant brought them, as well as his sword, upon which he went to the Mussappi Serai (the palace for guests), accompanied in the same way as he had arrived. When he entered the palace assigned to him, all the civil officers, as well as Houssein Pasha, kissed his foot, and he asked them to take seats and gave them coffee, telling them, "Thank God, my wishes to meet the Viceroy are accomplished, and you may thank that I have obtained his Highness's permission for the landing of the Vice and the Rear Admirals."

With the Capudan Pasha ten officers landed, two of whom are Beys (Colonels), and one is the brother of Osman Pasha, the Ex-Egyptian Admiral who deserted to Constantinople more than five years ago.

Ibrahim Pasha is advancing on Asia Minor. Maggiun Aga, one of the officers who command the Egyptian van-guard, has written to the Governor of Sverick, a letter (which the latter transmitted to the Porte, and which the Chief Dragoman has seen) which says :—"His Highness the Generalissimo Ibrahim, having confided to me the Government of Orfa, Diarbekir, and Harpout, I am repairing thither with a considerable body of troops. On the receipt of this letter you will lose no time in finding and sending to me 600 camel-loads of barley, &c."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 225.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, July 26, 1839.

I EXPECT that, long before this arrives in London, the settlement between Mehemet Ali and the Porte will have been made. The answer to be given to-morrow to the demands of the Pasha of Egypt may not be satisfactory to him : but I think that either the Pasha will insist upon his demands, and the Porte will yield to them ; or the Pasha will take what is offered, and defer exacting the full measure until after he shall have completely established his authority in Constantinople, which he will do with very little delay. Perhaps this latter mode of acting may be the best for him ; because the proceeding can be so managed that the grant will have the air and the form of an act springing spontaneously from the Porte ; and as such it will be less subject to the criticism of foreign Governments. I consider the Ottoman Empire to be delivered over to Mehemet Ali.

In the absence of instructions to direct my conduct, I remain passive, after having taken those steps (reported in my late despatches) which were intended to delay any settlement that should not be in concurrence with the interests and counsels of England and France.

Her Majesty's Government has learned from Colonel Campbell the demands made by Mehemet Ali. I am informed, and I think correctly in substance, that the answer to be given by the Porte is, "The hereditary government of Egypt to be granted to Mehemet Ali, and the government of Syria to be granted to Ibrahim Pasha till the death of Mehemet Ali, when the government of Syria is to be again at the disposal of the Porte."

This answer given by the Porte would be inconsistent with the promises made to me by the Grand Vizier.

No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 17.)

(Extract.)

Therapia, July 29, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Collective Note signed by the Representatives of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, on the 27th instant.

The Note was yesterday presented by the Dragomans of the Five Powers to the Sublime Porte, and cheerfully and gratefully received by the Grand Vizier, on the 28th. I inclose Dragoman Pisani's report to me of what took place on that occasion.

Baron Stürmer received Prince Metternich's instructions on the morning of the 27th, and the Note, signed, was ready in the evening. I beg leave to express with all humility my approbation of the activity and promptitude with which the Baron acted ; and I consider the measure to be the most salutary step that could have been taken. It was also most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman

Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country. This measure has given force and courage to the Grand Vizier to resist the Pasha, and to maintain the rights and interests of the Sultan. It will also, I think, insure the tranquillity of the Capital, and the security, therefore, of the foreign and Christian populations and inhabitants. It opens the road for all that may be considered right to be done by Her Majesty's Government. It has placed Her Majesty's Government in a position that enables it to secure the future integrity and independence of Turkey.

I fear the state of Asia Minor is very unsatisfactory, but it is natural that it should be so after the late events. It is not to be imagined that Mehemet Ali will neglect any means in his power to augment disorder everywhere, but he is himself the source of all the dangers and difficulties, and if he be forced to desist from pursuit of his ambitious plans, order will be easily restored. If Her Majesty's Government will secure Constantinople against all attack, there will be no just cause for alarm from anything that can be done to disturb the peace, or alter the balance of power in Europe; but if that main object be neglected, there must be, eventually, a complete failure of all that is attempted to preserve the common interests, and to escape a war at some future, and probably not distant, period.

P. S.—I inclose a translated copy of the Pasha of Egypt's letter to the Grand Vizier.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Collective Note of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, ce 27 Juillet, 1839.

LES Soussignés ont reçu ce matin de leurs Gouvernemens respectifs des instructions, en vertu desquelles ils ont l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte, que l'accord sur la Question d'Orient est assuré entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances, et de l'engager à suspendre toute détermination définitive sans leur concours, en attendant l'effet de l'intérêt qu'elles lui portent.

(Signé)

PONSONBY,

Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

BARON DE STURMER,

Internonce d'Autriche.

COMTE KONIGSMARCK,

Ministre de Prusse.

BARON ROUSSIN,

Ambassadeur de France.

A. BOUTENEFF,

Ministre de Russie.

(Translation.)

Collective Note of the Five Powers.

Constantinople, July 27, 1839.

THE Undersigned have received, this morning, from their respective Governments instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on the Question of

the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence, waiting for the effect of the interest which those Powers feel for it.

(Signed)

PONSONBY,

Ambassador of England.

BARON DE STURMER,

Internuncio of Austria.

COUNT KONIGSMARCK,

Minister of Prussia.

BARON ROUSSIN,

Ambassador of France.

A. BOUTENEFF.

Minister of Russia.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Péra, ce 28. Juillet, 1839.

JE m'empresse de rendre compte à Votre Excellence du résultat de la mission dont mes Collègues les Premiers Drogmans de France, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, et moi, avons été chargés auprès de Son Excellence le Moustéchar Nouri Effendi, résultat, comme Votre Excellence va voir, extrêmement satisfaisant.

Nous avons remis la Note Collective signée hier par leurs Excellences les Représentans des Grandes Puissances, et relative à la Question d'Orient, au Moustéchar, à qui nous avons, à même tems, présenté une traduction Turque de la susdite Note. Le Moustéchar ayant lu la Note, a fait quelques observations qui dénotaient qu'il en était très-satisfait, et il est allé la faire voir au Grand Vizir, qui n'a pas tardé à nous faire chercher.

Nous avons trouvé Son Altesse avec les Moustéchars Nouri Effendi et Sarim Effendi. Son Altesse a parlé dans les termes les plus obligeans des offres bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances, et de leurs excellentes dispositions envers la Porte. Nous avons assuré les Ministres que les Grandes Puissances, extrêmement intéressées à la Question d'Orient, sont résolues de la terminer, tout en consultant la dignité de la Sublime Porte et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. Les Ministres ont été on ne peut plus satisfaits de ce que nous venions de leur dire, et le Grand Vizir, surtout, en a exprimé toute sa reconnaissance, en disant : "Voilà, en effet, comment des Gouvernemens doivent en agir envers les autres Gouvernemens." Après quoi, Son Altesse nous a dit que la notification que nous venions de faire à la Sublime Porte par une Note Officielle revêtue des signatures des Représentans des Cinq Grandes Puissances, ne laissait plus aucun lieu à envoyer Saib Effendi à Alexandrie; mais qu'attendu qu'il faut une réplique à la réponse de Méhémet Ali, envoyée par le canal d'Akiff Effendi, elle va lui écrire, qu'aussitôt après l'arrivée d'Akiff Effendi à Constantinople, la Sublime Porte s'est occupée de cette affaire, et qu'elle était à la veille de prendre une détermination, mais que MM. les Interprètes des Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont présentés à la Porte avec une Note Officielle, pour l'engager, au nom de MM. les Représentans de ces Puissances, de ne prendre aucune détermination sans leur concours, ce à quoi Elle a dû adhérer pour ne pas manquer aux égards qu'exige d'Elle la sollicitude témoignée ainsi par les Grandes Puissances.

Le Grand Vizir nous a chargés, my Lord, de prier nos Ministres respectifs d'écrire des lettres analogues aux Consuls à Alexandrie; et nous avons assuré Son Altesse que MM. les Représentans s'empresseront d'écrire dans le même sens à MM. les Consuls.

Le Grand Vizir et les deux Moustéchars ont décidé, comme mesure très-convenable, que la lettre de Son Altesse sera portée à Méhémet Ali par le Capi Kiaja, c'est-à-dire l'Agent de ce Pacha près la Porte, qui fera le voyage dans un bateau à vapeur de la Marine Ottomane, lequel devra partir après-demain; et Son Altesse a exprimé le désir que, de la même manière que le Capi Kiaja doit emporter la lettre Viziriale à Méhémet Ali, une personne au choix de MM. les

Représentans soit destinée à se rendre à Alexandrie par la même occasion, chargée des dépêches de leurs Excellences pour les Consuls.

Nous avons promis au Grand Vizir de porter fidèlement à la connaissance de nos Ministres respectifs tout ce que Son Altesse venait de nous dire, et nous nous sommes retirés.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Pera, July 28, 1839.

I HASTEN to give your Excellency an account of the mission to his Excellency the Moustechar Nouri Effendi, with which my Colleagues, the Dragomans of France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and myself were entrusted, — a result, as your Excellency will see, extremely satisfactory.

We delivered to the Moustechar the Collective Note relative to the Eastern Question, signed yesterday by their Excellencies the Representatives of the Great Powers; presenting him, at the same time, with a Turkish translation of the said Note. The Moustechar having read the Note, made some observations which showed that he was very well satisfied with it, and he went to show it to the Grand Vizier, who presently sent for us.

We found His Highness with the Moustechars Nouri Effendi and Sarim Effendi. His Highness spoke in the most obliging terms of the kind offers of the Great Powers, and of their excellent dispositions towards the Porte. We assured the Ministers that the Great Powers, being deeply interested in the Eastern Question, are resolved to bring it to a conclusion, having respect, at the same time, for the dignity of the Sublime Porte, and for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was impossible for the Ministers to be better satisfied than they were with what we had said to them, and the Grand Vizier especially expressed all his gratitude, saying, "See, in truth, how Governments ought to act towards other Governments." Afterwards His Highness said to us that the notification which we had just made to the Sublime Porte by an Official Note, signed by the Representatives of the Five Great Powers, rendered it no longer necessary to send Said Effendi to Alexandria; but that as it was necessary to make some reply to the answer of Mehemet Ali, sent by Akiff Effendi, he would write to him, that immediately after the arrival of Akiff Effendi at Constantinople, the Sublime Porte had occupied itself with this affair, and was on the eve of taking a decision thereupon; but that the Interpreters of the Five Great Powers presented themselves to the Porte with an Official Note, inviting it, in the name of the Representatives of those Powers, not to take any resolution without their concurrence, to which the Porte could not but assent, in order not to be wanting in the consideration which the solicitude thus evinced by the Great Powers requires of it.

The Grand Vizier commissioned us, my Lord, to request our respective Ministers to write corresponding letters to the Consuls at Alexandria; and we assured His Highness, that the Representatives would readily write to the same effect to the Consuls.

The Grand Vizier and the two Moustechars have decided, as a very proper course, that His Highness' letter should be conveyed to Mehemet Ali by the Capi Kiaja; that is to say, the Agent of that Pasha at the Porte, who will make the voyage in a steam-vessel of the Ottoman Navy, which will start the day after to-morrow; and His Highness expressed a desire, that in the same way as the Capi Kiaja is to deliver the Vizirial letter to Mehemet Ali, so a person selected by the Representatives should be appointed to proceed to Alexandria by the same opportunity, with their Excellencies' despatches to the Consuls.

We promised the Grand Vizier faithfully to make known to our respective Ministers everything that His Highness had said to us, and we withdrew.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

d'entrer à ce sujet dans de plus amples développemens. D'ailleurs, notre intention n'est point ici de provoquer une discussion quelconque sur une éventualité qui, nous l'espérons, ne se réalisera pas; notre unique désir est simplement de mettre le Cabinet Français à même de se pénétrer des intentions et des intérêts qui servent de règle à la politique de la Russie. Eclaircir mutuellement la position des Cabinets, c'est incontestablement le moyen le plus sûr de maintenir le parfait accord si heureusement établi entre eux: union désirable, parcequ'elle renferme en elle, ainsi que M. le Duc de Dalmatie dans une de ses communications récentes l'a si bien observé, la garantie la plus solide pour rassurer les amis de la paix.

C'est dans cet esprit de conciliation et de parfait accord, que vous êtes chargé de vous acquitter auprès de M. le Président du Conseil, de la communication contenue dans la présente dépêche dont vous voudrez bien lui donner lecture et remettre copie.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signée) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*Count Nesselrode to Count Medem. (Communicated by M. de Kisseleff,
August 19, 1839.)*

M. le Comte,

St. Petersburg, ^{July 25,}_{August 6,} 1839.

IN the midst of the events which seem from day to day to aggravate more seriously the state of affairs of the Levant, the Emperor has considered it necessary that his Representatives should be exactly apprized, both of the opinion which he has formed of the present situation of the Ottoman Empire, and of the resolutions which he has taken to counteract the dangers which threaten at the present time to compromise the peace of the East.

It is by the express order of our August Master, that I make it my duty, M. le Comte, to acquaint you, in the most positive manner, with his thoughts and determinations.

The Emperor feels conscious of having done all in his power to prevent a conflict between Turkey and Egypt. He addressed to Sultan Mahmoud the most serious representations, in order to deter him from the idea of engaging in a struggle of which our August Master foresaw the deplorable consequences.

The event has but too far realised our anticipations and justified our remonstrances. The action of the $\frac{1}{2}$ of June, has destroyed the Turkish Army. The treason of the Capudan Pasha has filled up the measure of the misfortunes which have marked the close of Sultan Mahmoud's reign.

Notwithstanding so many disasters, his son Abdul Medjid has ascended the throne, without his accession being accompanied with those scenes of disorder and of trouble, of which the history of Turkey offers us such frequent examples. Far from this being the case, the latest reports from our Minister at Constantinople attest, that the solemnity of the coronation has been accompanied by unanimous demonstrations of respect and of fidelity in the midst of that immense population of the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the tranquillity of which has not been troubled for a single moment.

In this state of affairs, the Emperor in no wise despairs of the safety of the Porte, provided that the Powers of Europe know how to respect its tranquillity, and that they do not by inopportune agitation end by unsettling, at the same time that they wish to consolidate, it.

Few words will suffice, M. le Comte, to place before you our whole opinion in this respect.

The situation in which the Porte finds itself at present, however difficult it may be, is not novel. During a long course of years, it has always committed the same faults, and experienced the same disasters. But, guided by a secret instinct for its own preservation, it has always known how to avoid the fatal moment which would bring on its fall.

At the present day, actuated by the same idea of preservation, it is on the

eve of once more entering into an arrangement with Mehemet Ali. It has already caused to be made to him for this purpose offers of conciliation, which it has hastened to communicate to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers. Further, it has asked for their support at Alexandria, in order to persuade the Pasha to accept the proposals which it has just made to him.

In this manner, the work which the Cabinets of Europe are called upon to perform, has been clearly pointed out to them by the Porte itself. They have to support its overtures at Alexandria; to prevail upon Mehemet Ali to accept them; not to allow him to impose more onerous conditions on the Sultan; in one word, to place the Pasha under the necessity of adopting the bases of a definitive arrangement which Europe is authorized to consider as stable, because it is an equitable one.

This, M. le Comte, is the work which the Cabinets of Europe will have to perform. To attain this end, it is necessary that all their efforts should be concentrated at Alexandria. To direct their action towards Constantinople, would be to direct their efforts to the side from which the danger does not come. There, neither diplomatic agitation is necessary, nor the display of military force; tranquillity alone is wanting.

This conviction has dictated the resolutions of the Emperor. In the midst of the general agitation which the crisis in the Levant has produced, he has experienced neither uneasiness nor impatience to act. He has made no demonstration; he has not sent to Constantinople a single ship, or a single soldier, in the firm persuasion that his inaction would do the Porte more good than his army or his fleet could have done.

Such is the attitude which the Emperor has taken.

Wherefore, if Russia, whose most direct interests are engaged in the present crisis, and whose frontiers are immediately adjacent to those of Turkey, appears at the present time to be neither uneasy, nor impatient to appear on the theatre of events, it seems to us, that much more can the Powers, whose safety is in no way compromised, and who are separated by great distances from the Ottoman Empire, adopt, without the least inconvenience, the same attitude, and moderate their action.

In this expectation, our August Master flatters himself that the French Government, guided by the policy full of foresight which it has pursued up to this day, will not endeavour to complicate the situation of the Ottoman Empire by a display of naval force, which, instead of preserving peace at Alexandria, would unsettle peace at Constantinople.

If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor has reason to found upon the moderation of the French Government, should not be realized; if the appearance of a foreign fleet in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate the state of affairs at Constantinople; the course which Russia would have to pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet, the Emperor's Minister would formally protest against the flagrant violation of the principle of the closing the Dardanelles; a principle which the Porte has at all times considered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has engaged itself to us invariably to maintain; he would declare that he regarded this violation as contrary to the independence of the Porte; he would immediately suspend his functions, and quit Constantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor to take such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the Porte in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its engagements towards us, free from all foreign constraint.

Such, M. le Comte, would be the inevitable consequences of the appearance of a French squadron in the Sea of Marmora.

As it is more than ever necessary that the Cabinets of Europe should give an account to themselves of their relative positions, and that they should give proofs in this respect of the greatest sincerity towards one another, our Cabinet has thought that it was its duty to give to the French Government a clear and positive explanation of the steps which we should be obliged to take, in the event of the case of which I have just made mention ever being realized. In this case, the part which we should have to take, would not depend on our own free choice; it would be imposed on us by the exigencies of our policy, as well as by the most direct interests of our Empire. A glance thrown upon the map

will explain the difference which exists in this respect between the geographical position of Russia, and that of the Western Powers.

In fact, when a Russian squadron anchored in the Bosphorus in 1833, its presence could neither be considered as a threat directed against the French Navy, nor as a blow struck at the commercial prosperity of Marseilles. But if, at the present moment, a French squadron should make its appearance at Constantinople, its presence would react directly upon Odessa and Sevastopol.

The French Ministry is too enlightened and too just not to acknowledge the difference of position which I have just pointed out. In 1833 we protected the Porte without offering any affront to the Western Powers. In 1839, the foreign squadrons, without protecting the Porte, would come to insult Russia.

It is sufficient for us to have clearly established this distinction, which dispenses us from entering upon this subject in fuller particulars. Besides, our intention now is not to provoke any discussion whatever with respect to a contingency, which we hope will not be realised; our desire is simply to enable the French Cabinet to comprehend fully the intentions and the interests which serve as a rule for the policy of Russia. Mutually to clear up the position of the Cabinets, is incontestably the surest means of maintaining the perfect agreement so happily established among them; a union desirable, because it contains in itself, as the Duke of Dalmatia in one of his recent communications has so well observed, the most solid guarantee for reassuring the friends of peace.

It is in this spirit of conciliation and of perfect concord, that you are authorized to make to the President of the Council the communication contained in the present despatch, which you will have the goodness to read to him, and of which you will give him a copy.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 235.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 20, 1839.

M. DE KISSELEFF communicated to me yesterday a copy of the despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Medem, of the ^{25 July} _{6 August} which, it appears from your despatch of August 10, Count Nesselrode himself has shown to your Excellency.

With reference to that part of the despatch which relates to the passage of the Dardanelles by a French squadron, I read to M. de Kisseleff the three instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, of which I inclose copies*, in order to show to M. de Kisseleff that the Russian Government had misconceived the nature of the demand which the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to make,—that in certain contingencies the fleets of their respective nations might be permitted to pass the Dardanelles. I pointed out to M. de Kisseleff that such demand was not made with any view of hostility against Sevastopol or Odessa, but solely for the protection of Constantinople, and not upon the principle of separate action on the part of England and of France, but for the purpose of maintaining a joint action on the part of the Five Powers.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

* See Nos. 90, 117, and 120.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 20, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct you to state to the French Government, with reference to the communications which have passed between the two Governments, about the measures to be taken for restoring to the Sultan the Turkish fleet, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Collective Note presented to the Porte, on the 28th ultimo, by the Representatives of the Five Powers, affords a strong reason to Great Britain and France for pursuing a different course on this important matter from that which they had before contemplated.

The Governments of England and France are friends and allies of the Sultan, and have spontaneously and formally declared their determination to uphold the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty, and to oppose themselves to any combination which might be calculated to trench upon that integrity and independence. But it is manifest that Mehemet Ali, by retaining the Turkish fleet, avowedly as a means of extorting from the Sultan the concession of certain demands, does openly attack the independent political action of the Sultan, and does, by a combination with the traitorous Commander of the Turkish fleet, endeavour to possess himself of the means of destroying the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's Government is therefore of opinion, that the Governments of France and England are bound, no less by a regard for their recent declarations, and a respect for their own honour, than by considerations of sound policy, to compel Mehemet Ali to give back to his own lawful Sovereign the ships of that Sovereign, which he now, in violation of every principle of duty and good faith, persists in retaining for purposes hostile to that Sovereign. But as the Five Powers have now, by the Note of the 27th ultimo, placed themselves collectively in the situation of mediators between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that all further steps in this matter ought to be taken, if possible, collectively by the Five; and that the decision as to such steps should emanate from Vienna, which is the central point of the negotiation, instead of from London or Paris.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, are about to send immediately instructions to Lord Beauvale, to propose to the Representatives of the other Four Powers the steps which, under all circumstances, appear to Her Majesty's Government the fittest to be taken with respect to the Turkish fleet; and to state to the Representatives of those Powers, that it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the restoration of that fleet by Mehemet Ali should be insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatever upon any other point.

The course which Her Majesty's Government would propose for the attainment of this object is, that the Consular Agents of the Five Powers at Alexandria should be instructed by the Ambassadors and Ministers at Vienna, formally, and in a Collective Note, to demand from Mehemet Ali the immediate restitution of the Turkish ships, together with such of the officers and men as may be willing to return to their allegiance; that if this demand be complied with, the Turkish ships should be placed under the care and custody of the combined English, French, and Austrian squadron; the Admirals of which would take care not to permit any of those Turkish ships to go up to Constantinople, without being first certain by communications with the Turkish Government, that the fidelity of the officers and men could be relied upon, and that there would be no danger of their again revolting against the Porte, in the event of their being sent back to Constantinople.

If any doubt should be entertained on this point, the ships should be kept at Rhodes or elsewhere outside of the Dardanelles, or they should be accompanied to Constantinople by some ships of the combined fleet; or else they should be sent back with merely officers and men enough to navigate them, and perhaps a guard belonging to the Allies on board each ship.

The Consular Agents should have no power to negotiate as to the surrender of the Turkish ships, nor to allow Mehemet Ali more than a stated period,—

No. 373.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 15.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 22, 1839.

I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the Sublime Porte, dated 21st instant.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 373.

*Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.**Constantinople, le 13 Chaban, 1259.**(21 Octobre, 1839.)*

(Traduction.)

ON sait qu'aussitôt après l'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, le pardon que Sa Hautesse daignait accorder à Méhémet Ali, Pacha d'Egypte, à condition que les hostilités cesseraient par terre et par mer, fut publié, et annoncé à tous les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Empire; et que, bientôt après, les Cinq Puissances Alliées se chargèrent de l'arrangement et de la conclusion de la Question Egyptienne.

On sait aussi qu'en attendant la décision des Cinq Puissances, et pour laisser les choses dans l'état où elles étaient, la Sublime Porte fit savoir à ses généraux, dans leurs campemens respectifs, qu'il fallait éviter absolument, la circonstance arrivant, tout conflit avec les troupes Egyptiennes, et qu'elle ne cesse encore de faire les mêmes recommandations.

Il était donc nécessaire, qu'en attendant l'heureuse issue de la médiation des Puissances, Méhémet Ali Pacha s'abstint aussi de tout mouvement hostile. On voit cependant par les dépêches successives communiquées aux Représentans des Cinq Puissances, que les troupes du Pacha, sous prétexte, tantôt de prendre des quartiers d'hiver, tantôt de poursuivre leurs déserteurs, se sont peu à peu portées en avant des lieux qu'elles occupaient et se sont établies dans diverses villes, bourgs et villages. Les commandans de l'Armée Ottomane, se conformant aux instructions de la Sublime Porte, ne se sont pas opposés à ces envahissemens de territoire; ils se sont contentés d'en informer le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et de demander à cet égard l'expression de la volonté Impériale.

Or, il serait contraire à la déclaration officielle de la Sublime Porte qu'elle autorisât ses sujets à repousser par la force l'agression Egyptienne. D'un autre côté, il est impossible d'envoyer aux habitans des lieux dont les Egyptiens veulent s'emparer des instructions pour qu'ils les y reçoivent.

En conséquence, outre la difficulté qui résulte pour la Sublime Porte de ce fait en lui-même, il ne lui paraît pas convenable, après l'acceptation de l'intervention des Cinq Puissances, de pourvoir, sans les consulter, aux mesures qu'exige une affaire aussi délicate.

La Sublime Porte se regarde donc comme obligée par la nature de l'affaire aussi bien que par celle de ses rapports d'amitié avec les Cinq Puissances, d'en faire part à leurs Représentans et de s'en référer à eux quant à la marche qu'elle doit adopter.

La présente Note est adressée à M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, de même qu'elle l'est à M. l'Intendant d'Autriche, à MM. les Ministres de Russie et de Prusse, et à M. le Chargé d'Affaires de France, et c'est pour nous une occasion de lui renouveler l'assurance de notre haute considération.

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

*Note from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Five Powers.**Constantinople, 13th Chaban, 1259.**(October 21, 1839.)*

IT is known that immediately after the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne, the pardon which His Highness was pleased to grant to Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, on condition that hostilities should cease by land and by sea, was published and notified to all the high functionaries of the Empire; and that presently afterwards the Five Allied Powers undertook to settle and conclude the Egyptian Question.

It is also known, that while waiting for the decision of the Five Powers, and in order to leave matters in the state in which they were, the Sublime Porte acquainted its Generals in their several positions, that it was absolutely necessary to avoid, the case occurring, any conflict with the Egyptian troops, and that the Porte does not even now cease to issue the same injunctions.

It was necessary, therefore, that while waiting for the happy issue of the mediation of the Powers, Mehemet Ali should also abstain from all hostile movements. It appears, however, by the successive despatches communicated to the Representatives of the Five Powers, that the troops of the Pasha, under pretext, at one time of taking up winter quarters, at another of following deserters, have by degrees advanced from the positions which they occupied, and have established themselves in different cities, towns, and villages. The Commanders of the Ottoman Army, in obedience to the instructions of the Sublime Porte, have not opposed these encroachments; they have confined themselves to reporting them to the Government of His Highness, and to demanding the enunciation of the Imperial pleasure in respect to this matter.

Now, it would be at variance with the official declaration of the Sublime Porte, if it were to authorize its subjects to repel by force the Egyptian aggression. On the other hand it is impossible to direct the inhabitants of the places which the Egyptians wish to make themselves masters of, to receive them.

Consequently, besides the difficulty which the Sublime Porte experiences from this circumstance alone, it does not consider it proper, after having accepted the intervention of the Five Powers, to have recourse, without consulting them, to the measures which so delicate an affair requires.

The Sublime Porte then considers itself obliged by the nature of the affair, as well as by the nature of its friendly relations with the Five Powers, to communicate thereupon with the Representatives, and to refer to them as to the course which it should adopt.

The present note is addressed to the Ambassador of England, in the same manner as it is addressed to the Internuncio of Austria, the Ministers of Russia and of Prussia, and the Chargé d'Affaires of France; and the doing so affords me an opportunity of repeating to him the assurance of our high consideration.

(Signed) RECHID.

No. 374.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 16.)

(Extract.)

Aleppo, September 23, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of my despatch of the 20th instant, to Viscount Ponsonby, which I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

Since the date of my inclosed despatch to his Excellency the Ambassador, nothing of any interest has transpired on this frontier, or within the jurisdiction of this Consulate, which merits your Lordship's attention.